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Digital forensics examiners have a growing problem caused by their own success. The
need for digital forensics is increasing and so are the devices that need examining. Not only
are the number of devices growing, but so is the amount of information those devices can
hold. One result of this problem is a growing backlog that could soon overwhelm digital
forensics labs across the country.
One way to combat this growing problem is to use digital triage to find the most pertinent information first. Unfortunately, although several digital forensics models have been
created, very few digital triage models have been developed. This results in most organizations, if they perform digital triage at all, performing digital triage in an untested ad hoc
fashion that varies from office to office.
This dissertation will contribute to digital forensics science by creating and testing a
digital triage model. This model will be semi-automated to allow for the use by untrained
users; it will be as operating system independent as possible; and it will allow the user

to customize it based on a specific crime class or classes. The use of this model will decrease the amount of time it takes a digital triage examiner to make a successful assessment
concerning evidence.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Digital forensics is a young field with many opportunities for research and development. This dissertation shows the results of creating and testing a methodology for a
sub-phase of digital forensics commonly known as digital triage.
Digital triage is a process that occurs prior to the actual examination of the digital
evidence in computer forensics. It is used as a technique to gather intelligence quickly
when the situation calls for it. Digital triage has different uses depending on where it is
utilized. It can be used in the field to help guide the search and seizure process, in the
office to help determine if a piece of media is worth submitting for analysis, or in the
digital forensics laboratory to assist in case prioritization.
There have been very few efforts to date attempting to create a digital triage process
model. This dissertation presents the creation and testing of such a model. The model
will be designed, each phase will be tested, and then it will be determined if the use of the
proposed digital triage processing model can increase the efficiency of the digital triage
process.
The hypothesis of the proposed dissertation is that the use of this model during digital
triage will decrease the time it takes to perform digital triage, as digital triage is defined
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in this proposal, by at least 50% without decreasing the accuracy rate of decisions made
during digital triage.
This chapter will define computer forensics, define the digital triage process, and describe further the hypothesis tested in this dissertation.

1.1

Digital Forensics
Digital forensics involves the post-event processing of a piece of digital media for ar-

tifacts of interest. An event in this case means a crime against a computer, a crime where
a computer was a tool, or a crime where the computer is incidental to the crime[39]. This
analysis usually involves the examination of the media for artifacts that can be used in a
court of law. Since these items are to be used in a court of law, they have to be gathered
using proven, forensically sound methodologies. Present day, these proven methodologies
are typically standard operating procedures created independently by each office. Several models have now been written to better explain digital forensics and to attempt to
make the digital forensics process more universal. Many of these models are based on or
enhancements to the framework proposed by the first Digital Forensics Research Workshop(DFRWS) held in 2001[46].
This first framework consisted of the following phases:
1. Identification: the identifying of all physical items that could contain digital evidence
2. Preservation: a stage and an umbrella activity aimed at physical and logical protection to prevent data alteration and challenges in court
3. Collection: the gathering of the evidence without altering it
4. Examination and Analysis: the processing of the digital evidence for digital artifacts
of evidentiary value
2

5. Presentation: the presenting of the evidence in a format the investigator can understand
6. Decision: involves those conclusions made from the Presentation phase

Although other models have additional phases or label their phases differently, the basic
process is still the same and may have been best simplified by Warren Kruse as the the three
A’s of computer forensics[39]. Evidence has to be acquired without being altered; it has to
be authenticated to prove it was not altered; and it has to be analyzed without alteration.
This and other forensic process models are presented in more detail in Chapter 2.
The forensic imaging and authentication in the preservation phase of the digital forensic
process is the most costly phase. Kenneally et al. makes the statement that the imaging of
every piece of media before examining it is time and money intensive and does not necessarily result in more reliable evidence than imaging just the digital artifacts of interest[35].
However, complete forensic duplication is standard practice among digital forensic laboratories. Forensic imaging involves the duplication of every piece of media seized prior to it
being examined and the authentication of each duplicate through the use of a strong hashing algorithm. Hashing is a mathematical technique that translates a variable length input
into a fixed length output. Any change in the input typically results in a drastic change in
the output. This fixed length output serves as a digital finger print that can be used to verify
the evidence has not been altered[8].
Images can be either made with the use of an examination computer or a handheld
imager. The handheld imager is a specialized piece of hardware designed for the sole
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purpose of forensic imaging. Therefore, it is typically the faster option[47]. Consider the
following handheld imager speeds as claimed by the manufacturers.
Table 1.1
Time Comparison for Handheld Forensic Duplicators Current as of June 2011
Manufacturer
VOOM
Logicube
Tableau

Image
VOOM HardCopy3
Talon Advanced
Tableau TD1

Speed
7.1 GB/MIN
7.0 GB/MIN
6.0 GB/MIN

Time to Image 1TB
Approximately 145 Min
Approximately 145 Min
Approximately 167 Min

According to Table 1.1, using a hardware imager even in the best circumstance, an
examiner still cannot look at a 1 terabyte drive for at least 2.5 hours when following the
currently accepted digital forensics methodology. After the imaging process is complete,
there is still the long process of searching, organizing, and categorizing the data. This is
assuming nothing goes wrong during the imaging process. At present there is no other
accepted way to produce court admissible evidence. For a much more detailed comparison
of handheld imagers and more real world speeds, see the work done by Jack Riley of
Mississippi State University[47].
Since its inception, digital forensics has only grown more complex. Now digital examiner must not only process computer hard drives, but digital examiners must also examine
cell phones, personal digital assistants, Mp3 players, and any device that can hold digital
information. Also, the amount of data needed to be processed per device is constantly
growing and is likely to continue to do so[2]. The traditional process, as just described,
4

means that the evidence is not examined until it has all been duplicated, and as was briefly
shown this duplication process is not a quick one. This lengthy procedure creates many
problems for the digital forensic examiner including constantly working from a backlog
and large amounts of down time while waiting for machines to duplicate media.

1.2

Digital Triage
One answer to the growing problem of increasing backlogs due to growing hard drive

sizes is digital triage. Triage is a term used in the medical field meaning to separate patients
into those that will survive with no aide, those that can be saved with assistance, and those
that cannot be saved even with assistance. Triage is usually applied in dire circumstances
when there is no feasible way of treating every patient. In digital forensics it has come
to mean any process that occurs before the traditional collection and preservation phases
of the digital forensics process. It involves the examination of the digital artifacts that are
most likely to provide useful intelligence first and saving a complete examination for later.
The desired result of digital triage is quick intelligence, not necessarily court admissible
evidence, although information obtained can be admitted in certain circumstances such as
when only enough information is needed to seek a plea bargain or quick validation of
evidence is required. Digital triage can be conducted on site during search and seizure to
provide feedback to the search and seizure team, it can be conducted prior to submitting the
digital evidence to a laboratory to determine if the time a complete examination will take
is viable, or it can be performed in the laboratory as a tool for prioritizing case loads[16].
Consider the extreme case of a multi-terabyte drive that has already been wiped clean.
5

There is no reason to go through the lengthy duplication phase or send it off to a laboratory
for examination if there is no information there to be found. Consider also a search and
seizure of 20 multi-terabyte servers from a corporation. Would it not be better to determine
which machines are the most likely to hold the evidence before undertaking the lengthy
task of imaging each one?
Digital evidence is very fragile, and trust in digital evidence was, and in some sense
still is, very low. Thus, the first digital forensics methodologies were created with extreme
preservation in mind. Since then there have been many improvements in hardware and
software tools that can be utilized to prevent changing source media during examination
or previewing. Most importantly examiners now have hardware write blockers that can be
applied in conjunction with examination software that guarantee no write commands go
to the source media. However as always in the world of criminal justice and law, policies
are slow to change. Processes will need to be created, tested, and accepted in court before
examiners can veer too far from the current accepted methodology of duplicating every
piece of media before examining it.
Digital triage can have many uses once widely accepted by the law enforcement community. K. Rogers et al. in their work point out that intelligence gathered during digital
triage creates a feedback loop that can be used to guide investigators during search and
seizure[33]. For example, what about a child pornography case where no immediate contraband imagery is located, but clues found during digital triage point to external storage
such as optical media or external hard drives that have not yet been found? Digital triage
is certainly useful in this situation to help guide the search and seizure process. The psy6

chological effects of immediate intelligence during suspect interviews are important to
consider as well. Yeschke points out that the suspect is most vulnerable those first few
hours after being apprehended[50]. Perhaps the easiest way to locate the missing optical
media and external hard drives in our fictitious child pornography case is to ask the suspect
during their first interview where they are located.
Digital triage is commonly performed on both live and dead evidence. In a live evidence scenario the digital triage examiner is working on an active machine to extract data
elements needed for the investigation. For example, in the case of a live server digital triage
could be performed to prevent down time of the server or to perform selective extraction
of evidence due to storage constraints[35]. Another important use of live extraction with a
digital triage tool is when encountering a volume with full disk encryption. Extracting data
while the machine is still active allows the examiner to extract un-encrypted versions of
all files. Once the machine is turned off, all files become inaccessible unless the password
can be obtained. In this type of triage situation evidence altercation is unavoidable, but as
already discussed, with the proper documentation this should not be an issue to the courts.
Dead analysis is conducted on evidence that has already been powered off either because the computer housing it has been booted into a digital triage environment or it has
been seized and powered down. In a situation where the computer has been seized and analysis software/hardware is available, the digital media can be removed from the suspect’s
machine and attached through a hardware write blocker to another machine for analysis.
Another option with both a live or dead machine would be to boot it into a digital triage
environment with a live CD/DVD or bootable USB media. Once booted into this safe envi7

ronment, the evidence is essentially in a dead state, and although not as secure as it would
be with a hardware write blocker, it is protected from alteration.

1.2.1

Digital Triage Modeling

There is a precedence and existing tools for doing pre-examinations but few written
procedures. The FBI’s Image Scan tool for law enforcement use only is one such example
of a tool designed for digital triage. This tool allows for image and video file scanning prior
to evidence duplication. With this utility the digital triage examiner can scan for these files
and then extract a sampling to justify seizing the computer and requesting a warrant.
More recently commercial products have started to become available as well. IDEAL
Corporation produces several hardware solutions for doing digital triage (http://www.ideal
corp.com/). According to their online documentation their tool, consisting of software and
hardware components, allows a user with little to no technical training to gather ”actionable
intelligence within minutes.” ADF Solutions Incorporated has developed software for digital triage (http://adfsolutions.com/). They also claim to allow users with little or no training
to quickly gather intelligence. Finally, AccessData, a long time player in the world of digital forensics, has introduced a new tool for digital triage (http://accessdata.com/products/co
mputer-forensics/ad-triage). Their tool also promises to facilitate successful previewing by
novice users.
These tools can be very useful. However, what is missing is the validation and verification of the digital triage process, and thus much like the digital forensics process itself,
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even with the use of these tools the intelligence gathering process is still mostly ad hoc or
based on each examiner’s experience and/or each office’s standard operating procedures.
There have now been several published works attempting to codify a digital forensics
process model. However although some mention the possibility or the need, none seem
to include an actual digital triage process as part of their model. All the models typically
concentrate on what happens to the digital evidence after it has been duplicated and authenticated. There have also been very few attempts to create a process model just for digital
triage. One exception is the The Computer Forensics Field Triage Process Model[33]. This
model along with the other digital forensics models will be further discussed in Chapter 2.

1.2.2

Hypothesis and Contribution

The hypothesis of this dissertation is that the use of the Semi-automated Crime Specific Digital Triage Process Model will decrease the time it takes to perform digital triage,
as digital triage is defined here, by at least 50% without decreasing the accuracy rate of
decisions made during digital triage.
The testing of this hypotheses will contribute to scientific knowledge by formalizing
and providing verification for a process that is currently done today in an ad hoc fashion.
Several attempts have been made to model the process of digital forensics [3, 4, 6, 11, 12,
20, 30, 41, 46], but although some mention the need for a preprocess like digital triage,
none attempt to create one as part of their model, and few processes have been made that
are designed purely as a digital triage model[33].
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Even though there have been few attempts to create a digital triage process, the scientific community acknowledges that the ever increasing size of digital media is a problem
for digital forensics and digital triage could be one possible solution[2, 16, 34]. The few
attempts that have been made to create a digital triage process, or like routine, have not
included an automated process and has offered very little in the way of guidance for different classes of crime[24, 27, 33]. They also seem to depend a great deal on the expertise
of the examiner to determine where to look and what to look for. This leaves a need for
more automated and easier to use models for first responders and personnel with limited
forensic training.
If adapted, this model could increase the efficiency of digital triage and this dissertation
would support its use in digital investigations by showing the usefulness of digital triage
as well as the usefulness of the model itself.
Currently, as has been discussed, the standard operating procedure is to image every
piece of media prior to examination. This is creating a slow down in digital investigations
and contributing to the rising backlogs of digital examiners. For digital triage to be accepted it must be modeled, tested, and then accepted by the law enforcement community.
This work could contribute to that effort.
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CHAPTER 2
RELATED WORKS

This chapter reviews related works concerning digital forensics process modeling, digital triage modeling, digital triage, and analysis efforts useful or related to digital triage.
There are very few works directly related to digital triage modeling, but there are published works indirectly related to it such as digital forensic process models, digital triage,
user profiling, and case prioritization.

2.1

Existing Digital Forensics Process Models
For any process to be tested and proven it must first be modeled, and then that model

can be agreed upon as a standard procedure. The digital forensic process is not there
yet. Computer forensics is commonly carried out through the development of individual
office standard operating procedures [7]. These works represent an effort to codify these
procedures in the form of a model or framework to establish a more universal standard of
operations. They were important to include in this review to demonstrate what work has
already been done to model digital triage and to show that the model introduced herein is
unique.
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2.1.1

Digital Forensics Research Workshop (DFRWS) Models

The Digital Forensics Research Workshop is a non-profit volunteer organization started
in 2001. Their primary goal is to partner with academics and practitioners in an effort
to assist in guiding research and development of the digital forensics field. One of the
primary efforts of their first meeting was to define a framework for digital forensic science.
This framework was not necessarily intended as a useable model, but instead a guiding
framework for future works[46].
The DFRWS model is very important as it was one of the first attempts at modeling digital forensics and was created with the intention of being a grounded framework. It has the
basic structure described by Warren G. Kruse as the three A’s of digital forensics Acquire,
Authenticate, and Analyze[39]. Evidence is acquired without being altered; evidence is
authenticated to prove it was not altered; and finally evidence is analyzed without disrupting this authentication. The framework for the DFRWS model, as already mentioned in
Chapter 1, is the linear process shown here[46]:
1. Identification: the identifying of all physical items that could contain digital evidence
2. Preservation: a stage and an umbrella activity aimed at physical and logical protection to prevent data alteration and challenges in court
3. Collection: the gathering of the evidence without altering it
4. Examination and Analysis: the processing of the digital evidence for digital artifacts
of evidentiary value
5. Presentation: the presenting of the evidence in a format the investigator can understand
6. Decision: involves those conclusions made from the Presentation phase
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Even though this process was described as linear, it was mentioned that a feedback
mechanism should be introduced into the model to be more true to real life. In this same
line of thought, it was suggested that preservation should be classified as more of a guarded
principle across forensic categories. Preservation is not an activity that occurs once. Preservation is a need for every stage of digital forensics[8].
Mark Reith et al. proposed the Abstract Process Model[41]. They describe their model
as, an enhancement of the DFRWS model since it is inspired from it. They add the additional phases of Preparation, and Approach strategy after the Identification phase of the
DFRWS model, and a phase called Returning the Evidence to the end. The remaining
phases are named the same and are similar to the DFWRS model phases. Neither model
has digital triage as part of the process.
Seamus O Cirardhuain attempted to expand both the Abstract Process Model and the
Digital Forensics Research Workshop model with his model the Extended Model of Cybercrime Investigations[20]. His contribution was the expansion of the model to incorporate
the flow of information. His expanded model included Awareness, Authorization, Planning, Notification, Search for and identify evidence, Collection of evidence, Transport of
evidence, Storage of evidence, Examination of evidence, Hypothesis, Presentation of hypothesis, Proof/Defense of hypothesis, and Dissemination of information.
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2.1.2

Physical Crime Scene Adaptations

In 2003 Brian Carrier and Eugene Spafford published their model in the International
Journal of Digital Evidence[11]. Their main premise was to design a model using the
proven theories and techniques used in physical investigations. As they state,
”It is therefore important that a process model for the digital investigation
exists and that it easily interacts with the physical investigations that have long
existed.”
Their model contains 17 phases organized into 5 groups listed here along with the phase’s
primary goal.
• Readiness Phases: an on-going phase involving the preparedness of the facility to
handle digital investigations
• Deployment Phases: provides a mechanism for the incident to be detected and confirmed
• Physical Crime Scene Investigation Phases: processing the physical evidence at a
crime scene including the physical media that holds the digital evidence
• Digital Crime Scene Investigation Phases: processing the digital evidence
• Review Phase: looking for ways to improve the process by reviewing the investigation
The sub-phases that can concern digital triage are located in the Digital Crime Scene
phase.
• Preservation Phase: securing the digital evidence physically and logically as well as
performing any volatile memory extraction, live forensics, if called for
• Survey Phase: searching the digital evidence for the most logically useful information such as digital images in a child pornography case (this phase can occur on a
live system in the field making it essentially digital triage)
• Documentation Phase: The documentation of all evidence found
• Search and Collection Phase: More thorough examination using the information
obtained from the survey phase
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• Reconstruction: using advanced analysis techniques and experience to reconstruct
events on the computer
• The Presentation Phase: provide the results back to the physical investigation team

The overall goal of the Brian Carrier and Eugene Spafford model is to treat the digital
crime scene as a separate physical crime scene that feeds back into the real world. The
Survey Phase of this model along with the Search and Collection phase have connections
to digital triage. The survey phase if done in the field would actually be digital triage as it is
being conducted on the evidence prior to the evidence being forensically duplicated, and if
this phase was conducted in the office or in a forensics laboratory on the forensic duplicate,
then the only difference between this phase and digital triage is that it is being carried out
on a duplicate instead of the original. In both cases the evidence is being previewed in such
a fashion to guide an examiner through a more thorough examination later.
In 2004, Benansius Baryamureeba and Florence Tushabe sought to improve on Brian
Carrier and Eugene Spafford’s model[11] with their Enhanced Digital Investigation Process Model[3]. Their proposed groups were slightly different and allowed for an iterative
process instead of a linear one. However, the digital crime scene investigation phases were
the same as Brian Carrier and Eugene Spafford’s model[11]. This creates the same situation as far as digital triage is concerned. It is suggested as a need, but not described.
In 2004 Brian Carrier and Eugene Spafford presented another similar model[12]. They
replaced the Review Phase with one they called the Presentation Phase where the results of
the investigation are presented instead of the investigation process being reviewed. Once
again the important grouping is that of the digital crime scene phases. These sub-phases
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are Preservation and Documentation, Digital Evidence Searching and Documentation, and
Digital Event Reconstruction and Documentation. The first step taken with the digital
evidence is that of preserving it which involves making a forensic duplicate and authenticating it with a secure hash value. No room is left in this model for digital triage making
digital triage an optional event that would occur prior to digital crime scene investigation.
However, the authors of this work support the idea of digital triage with their statement,
”We have become used to the concept that an image of the disk exists, but this
concept may need to be reconsidered as disk sizes get larger and it becomes
infeasible to make copies of every disk. pp. 7”

2.1.3

Hierarchical Based Framework

Nicole Beebe and Jan Clark proposed a model they called A Hierarchical, ObjectivesBased Framework[4]. This model used inspiration from many of the models already
discussed[11, 20, 41, 46]. Their main contribution was the division of the phases into
first tier, principles, and multiple sub-phases. Their first tier phases were:
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• Preparation
• Incident Response
• Data Collection
• Data Analysis
• Presentation of Findings
• Incident Closure

Preparation is the same as the readiness and planning phases already discussed. Incident
Response involves developing a game plan and validating the suspected incident did occur.
They are not entirely clear, but it seems some digital evidence can be gathered at this point
from the suspect’s machine, but not a full examination or full collection. This is as close
as they come to a digital triage stage. The Data Collection Phase is where the complete
collection of all digital devices of evidentiary value would be collected, authenticated, and
transported. Data Analysis Phase is where the actual examination is performed. Presentation of Findings provides for the interpretation of the evidence into forms that can be used
in court presentations, reports, etc. This is the same as the previously described presentation phases. Incident Closure is the same as the review phase from Brian Carrier and
Eugene Spafford’s model already described[11].
Their main complaint with existing models is that most models to date are single-tier,
higher order process models. They use the analogy of flying an airplane being a function
of take-off, fly, and land. They point out this is not sufficient enough of a model and they
propose their model as a more comprehensive digital investigation framework that allows
for expansion with their hierarchical structure even though they do not actually elaborate
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on what most of those second tier sub-phases would contain. One improvement this model
did make was to remove those things that should be part of every phase and call them
principles. Good documentation is an example of a principle. Quality documentation
should be created and maintained through out all phases.
A digital triage process was not described, but would fit into the incident response
phase as part of the initial evidence gathering process. It is interesting that they never use
the term digital triage, but they are describing the need for such a separate process very
well.
”Some data and information will be initially collected during the Incident Response Phase, which is necessary to validate the incident and determine the
impact and nature of the incident. The formal Data Collection Phase, however, occurs subsequent to the Incident Response Phase once a decision has
been made that a digital investigation will ensue, regardless of its scope or
anticipated legal or administrative actions.”

The first model mentioned was that of the DFRWS framework. In describing this model
it was stated it follows the Warren G. Kruse pattern of the three A’s of computer forensics
Acquire, Authenticate, and Analyze. All of the models discussed so far are laid out in
this same linear fashion. None explicitly describe a digital triage process, but a few did
describe the need or include a sub-phase where it would clearly fit in. In seems clear that
all models agree for digital evidence to be admissible it must be acquired and authenticated
before being analyzed. This leads to the standard operating procedure of not looking at any
evidence until has been imaged first.
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This does not mean analysis can not be done for quick intelligence. The key is the
testing of the tools that are used to do the intelligence gathering to prove they do not alter
evidence and the documentation showing that the pre-analysis, digital triage, was done.

2.1.4

Outside the DFRWS Framework

Other models were examined that did not as easily relate to the structure proposed by
the DFRWS. In these models digital triage would fit in, but their processes were less of
a linear procedure and more of an alternate approach or a concentration on one particular
activity. A digital triage process was not proposed, but not excluded either. These models
are mostly independent of each other.
Christopher Bogen and David Dampier, using inspiration from software engineering
and the Unified Modeling Language views, suggest the separation of digital forensics modeling into three different views: Investigative Process View, Case Domain View, and Evidence View[6]. Their model concentrates on the actual examination phase. Therefore,
digital triage would be a task prior to their model. The inclusion of a digital triage stage
would not, however, interrupt their model.
Another model that introduced a process concentrating on the examination phase was
that of Gong Ruibin et al.[48]. In essence they were trying to describe what was already
going on instead of proposing a new model of action. They described the examination
phase as being carried out through the following cyclic steps.
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1. Seed Information Search
2. Data Filtering
3. Decision Making
4. Information Extraction
5. Query Refinement
Essentially an investigator develops a list of keywords to start the investigation. He or
she then filters the data based on those keywords, examines the results, and refines that
keyword list.
Their purpose in describing this model was so they could introduce an automated case
relevance information extraction process. Case relevance being a concept they proposed.
They define this concept as, ”the property of any piece of information, which is used to
measure its ability to answer the investigative ”who, what, where, when, why and how”
questions in a criminal investigation.”
They further provide a scale for case relevance ranging from Absolutely Irrelevant to
Probably Case-Relevant with various levels in between. Their described automated case
relevance information extraction routine is as follows:
1. Survey Sub-Phase: the creation of a case profile by a user to include a set of seed
words to begin the search
2. Extraction Sub-Phase: a fully automatic process that starts with a few keywords and
retrieves more and more case relevant data in an iterative fashion by increasing the
search results with synonyms of the current search words
3. Examination Sub-Phase: the examination of the results by an investigator to interpret
the evidence and determine if further extraction is required.
They go on to further explain how this iterative process would work. The relevance
to this dissertation is that it describes another process that does not include a digital triage
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stage. Processing of the evidence occurs first, and there is no pre-examination phase.
Secondly, an automated routine like this would be very useful in a digital triage tool if
it could be done in a timely manner. However, their routine requires large amounts of
comprehensive word searches which limits its usefulness to digital triage as those searches
would take a considerable amount of time with current technology.
The Ricci framework FORZA proposed in 2006 is organized more into roles than actual
events or actions[30]. These roles include:
• Case leader
• System/business owner
• Legal advisor
• Security/system architect/auditor
• Digital forensics specialist
• Digital forensics investigator/system administrator/operator
• Digital forensic analyst
• Legal prosecutor

For each role there is a set of six key questions what, why, how, who, where, and when that
helps guide the tasks of that role.
This model deals less with the process of specific events and more with the organization
of tasks. There is no inclusion of a digital triage process. However, in this situation the
digital forensic specialist would decide the strategy which may or may not include a digital
triage process. It would be up to the digital forensics investigator to carry out the process if
needed, and either the investigator or the examiner to interpret the results. The information
provided by the triage process would help answer the six key questions, and could be used
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to guide the rest of the steps. The model proposed for this work could be used in that
optional digital triage phase.

2.2

Digital Triage
The following works are those that provide support for, model, or discuss the need for

digital triage. They served to provide a deeper understanding of the need for triage, to help
show support for its need and use, and to examine how it is currently being used.

2.2.1

A Call for Digital Triage

One of the efforts of the Colloquium for Information Systems Security Education
(CISSE) in June of 2008 was to develop an outline for future research in digital forensics. After deciding that law and education deserved separate consideration, they created
categories for digital forensics research.These categories were:
• Evidence Modeling
• Network Forensics
• Data Volume
• Live Acquisition
• Media Types
• Control Systems

Two of their categories were of particular interest to this work. The call for evidence
modeling closely matches the crime potential templates described in the digital triage
model used in this dissertation. They call for the modeling of cases for specific crime
classes. Under the Data Volume category they also mention the need for research into
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tools that image and look for evidence at the same time. This is not a specific call for
digital triage, but the process described herein could be applied during imaging for case
prioritization if the technology was developed to do so.
In 2009 E. Casey et al. called for a departure from the traditional approach to seizing digital evidence in their paper Investigation Delayed is Justice Denied: Proposals for
Expediting Forensic examinations of Digital Evidence[16]. Referring to the traditional
digital forensics process where each piece of media is seized and duplicated before being
examined, they state, This approach is rapidly becoming untenable as more cases involve
increasing quantities of digital evidence. They propose that digital examinations be divided
into three categories:
1. Survey/triage forensic inspection
2. Preliminary forensic examinations
3. In-depth forensic examinations

Category 3 is well documented and can be considered the traditional forensic process.
The models discussed in the Digital Forensic Modeling section are good examples of category 3. This process involves the collection and duplication of every piece of media that
could possibly contain digital evidence. This a very lengthy and time consuming process.
They are proposing to only use this lengthy traditional process when it has already been
determined that a piece of media will contain evidence. This determination being made by
conducting preliminary examinations as described in categories 1 and 2.
As they describe it, the category 1 examinations determine if something of evidentiary
value is present on the media being examined, and category 2 translates that evidence into
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something the investigator can use. They do not actually describe a process model for what
should happen in category 1 and 2 exams, but describe how it can be useful and suggest a
few commercial tools. According to Casey et al. a lot of offices are already doing digital
triage in some form, but there are no published works or standard operating procedures for
digital triage leading to every office having no choice but to develop their on method [16].
Personal computers are not the only device that can be triaged. For example, in 2010
Chevonne Dancer, of Mississippi State University, describes the need for a digital forensics
process model for smart phones, and makes a call for the development of a process model
concentrating on those traits that are the same for all smart phones [21].
More specific to digital triage, that same year Richard Mislan et al. took the categories mentioned by Casey et al. just described [16] and attempted to expand the work
by describing the need for the category 1 and 2 examinations on mobile devices instead
of computers[42]. They point out that with the growth in cell phone and mobile device
use, digital forensic laboratories are becoming swamped with requests for mobile device
evaluation. This overload of requests could be greatly reduced through the triage of mobile devices to determine which mobile devices should be sent in for analysis as evidence,
which ones contain no evidence, and which ones could just be used for intelligence purposes. They also discuss the usefulness of performing mobile triage on the scene to guide
the investigator, an idea that has been mentioned by other works in support of digital triage.
Unfortunately triage technology for mobile devices is lacking especially when searching
for tools that perform push button forensics.
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Richard Mislan et al. offers a general set of guidelines for triage inspections instead
of a process model, and proposes a minimum set of requirements that also serve as good
guide lines for creating a digital triage tool for any media. Those rules are summarized and
paraphrased here with an emphasis on the applicability to this work.
• user-friendly to accommodate the less advanced user
• inform the user of what can and cannot be obtained from the device
• make no changes or inform the user if an action might cause a change
• acquire data accurately
• include security to prevent unauthorized use
• provide meaningful errors
• maintain a complete log

Their general guidelines or, ”standard operating procedures for handling sources of
digital evidence” are as follows.
1. initiate chain of custody
2. isolate device from network (if feasible and applicable)
3. disable security features (if feasible and applicable)
4. extract limited data
5. review extracted data
6. preview removable storage media

Their work was a call for more work in the triage area, but that call was aimed at mobile
devices. During that call they propose a process for extracting data from mobile devices
and a set of goals for a tool that would perform that extraction. That process and those
goals serves as support of this work, but not a replacement.
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Erin et al. make a call for an alternate approach to data collection in their paper, Risk
Sensitive Digital Evidence Collection[35]. They make the case that the current methodology of imaging all of the media before viewing it is not only time and resource draining,
but that changing the procedure does not necessarily result in less reliable evidence. There
just needs to be a change in the accepted methodology.
Their solution involves the selective extraction of artifacts during the imaging process
of digital forensics instead of the creation of a complete duplicate. Prior to this extraction
those artifacts have to be identified. They do not go into detail on how those artifacts
are chosen. In fact in their follow up paper at the DFRWS 2005 they make a call for
research into the creation of, as they describe it, ”formal protocol or artifact identification
(platform agnostic).” The proposed model in this work could be used as an identifier for
that selection.
Their work does not suggest digital triage as a solution per se, but they are describing
the need for a change in current methodologies which could include digital triage. If selective extraction were to become an accepted method of digital evidence collection, this
work would prove very useful in the determination of the artifacts to be extracted. Their
process is designed to be part of the collection phase, post digital triage. Although this
work could be beneficial to their effort, the two efforts are mutually exclusive.
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2.2.2

Digital Triage Process Model

None of the models discussed so far described the phases of a digital triage process
model. However, one separate digital forensics triage model was identified as the Computer
Forensics Field Triage Process Model[33]. Their model consists of the following phases:
1. Planning
2. Triage
3. Usage Profiles (Home directory, file properties, and registry)
4. Chronology/Timeline
5. Internet (Browser Artifacts, Email, IM)
6. Case Specific

Phase 1 is simply proper planning and preparation. Although not included in the original DFRWS model[46], this type of phase was proposed in many of the models that followed it and that have already been discussed[4, 3, 11, 12, 20, 41]. The triage phase is
similar to the category 1 exam described in[16]. Evidence is previewed and prioritized
based on what is likely to have the largest quantity or most valuable evidence. The remaining phases of this model more closely resemble category 2 examinations as described
by[16]. The Usage/User Profiles phase involves the examination of items that can potentially be tied to an individual by concentrating on items tied to specific user accounts.
The Chronology/Timeline phase is an attempt to sort and quantify the evidence based on
modified, accessed, and created time stamps. The Internet phase involves the examination
of items that pertain to Internet activity such as email and browser artifacts, and the Case
Specific phase involves the examination of items that would typically be associated with
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the case in question. For example, one could concentrate on finding images in a child
pornography case.
In 2002 Special Agent Jesse Kornblum described the need for digital triage tools and
described several primary goals that would be appropriate for such a tool. One of those
goals was that a first responder tool should do all the work without user intervention as
first responders will often be untrained[38]. The Computer Forensics Field Process Model
is described as a field model indicating its primary users will be first responders. However,
the types of searches described in this model would require a lot of expertise. The authors
even mention this at one point when they say, ”A thorough knowledge of user profiles and
artifacts relating to usage, are essential to accomplishing this goal.”
This model also seems to depend on the presence of an operating system as indicated
by the search for user profiles, and Internet artifacts. These items will typically only be
on the main operating system drive. If the media being examined is external storage, then
only phases 1, 2, and 6 are actually useful. Also, different operating systems are going
to have much different user profiles and store Internet artifacts differently. Therefore, it is
dependent on the first responder having expertise in user artifacts, but that expertise has
to also be in sync with the operating system in question. These weaknesses were kept in
mind when designing the model tested in this dissertation.

2.2.3

Dangers to Digital Triage

Although not specifically about digital triage, G. Bell, and R. Boddington performed a
series of experiments that could have a direct effect on digital triage[5]. It appears the next
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wave in hard drive technology is likely to be solid state drives according to G. Bell and R.
Boddington[5]. Solid state drives (SSDs) have no moving parts. Therefore, they are faster,
less error prone, and more energy efficient. They are faster, but unlike magnetic drives
there is a time penalty for writing over areas that have already been used as they have to be
erased first. Some of these SSD drives have started using idle time to erase unused sectors.
These erasure routines reside in the firmware of the drives. Being in firmware, there is no
way to interrupt the process with software.
This only affects deleted data. Therefore, it has no appreciable impact on the process
proposed in this dissertation. A digital triage process is typically going to concentrate on
present files as deleted files and file fragments take time to locate and extract. Therefore,
the effect on information retrieval is very low, and the digital triage process takes place
prior to the authentication phase leading to no effect on authentication.
This erasure process does occur just by the drive being powered on. Therefore, the digital triage examiner is altering the evidence just by powering a hard drive on, and could be
destroying evidence located in unallocated space. The actual likelihood of this was unclear
from their experiments, as the only drives tested were those that had been formatted. This
means they did not test it on files that were recently deleted or drives that are partially full.
Their tests also seem to indicate that the erasure process occurs quickly and is complete
within hours. This means that if the drive is being regularly used then there is likely
no evidence in unallocated space anyway. Finally, a case will typically not depend on
files that have been carved as they have no system metadata(ownership information, time
stamps, security information, etc), and although recently deleted files are admissible the
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best evidence items are those files that are present and being used. This study was further
supported later by Christopher King and Timothy Vidas in their article Empirical Analysis
of State Disk Data Retention When Used with Contemporary Operating Systems[37].
These works have no appreciable effect on this proposed process, but a digital triage
examiner should be aware of the issue. They can easily overcome this problem by being
aware that the problem exists, acknowledging that they are going to change the evidence,
producing proper documentation showing it was necessary, and being able to explain the
effect in court. Their experiments were based on if it happened. They were not based on
how it happened. Once the mechanism for doing this erasure is understood, then hopefully
ways for overcoming it can be developed and it will be avoided as an issue altogether.

2.3

User Profiling and Case Prioritization
A lot of work has been done on user profiling in the context of data mining for com-

mercial use, and a lot of work has been done on user profiling as it pertains to network
attacks and incident response. The concept of learning about users, as will need to be done
in the Computer Profiling stage of the model discussed in Chapter 3, is more limited. The
following works were insightful as to what has been done and what can feasibly be done
in the proposed model in relation to computer/user profiling.

2.3.1

User Text Classification

One of the first areas explored in this part of the review was the idea of what information can be gathered just by analyzing the text on a suspect’s machine. These papers
explore the idea of automated authorship analysis. Authorship analysis is not a new field
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as applied to the written or typed word, but attempts are now being made to bring it into
the digital forensics world. Some of the areas that have been explored include biometric analysis (determining a user by their keystroke patterns) qualitative analysis (based on
the examiner’s experience) and stylometry (focusing on countable language features and
idiosyncrasies)[18].
Patricia Carter in her work attempted to use login session data alone to identify a
user[13]. Patricia combined the logon session data, including which windows were opened
and which programs accessed, into a document. She then applied already successful authorship analysis algorithms to the problem of identifying which user was logged on from
a group of users.
Carole Chaski optimistically wrote about the use of authorship attribution in digital
investigation to determine the actual individual who was using the computer at the time
the evidence was created, a common concern in digital forensics[18]. She discusses the
problems with using authorship analysis in the digital world, and demonstrates it is possible
for it to be used by describing several experiments and through a discussion of examples
cases where it has been successfully used.
More recently there have been publications on the application of authorship analysis
for specific types of digital evidence such as instant messenger logs[45], and the microblogging website Twitter[40]. These works concentrate on finding solutions for the problem of performing authorship identification on limited sets of data.
Another effort worth mentioning is being undertaken by James Stinson of Mississippi
State University. His work, which is yet to be published, involves the authorship analysis
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of computer programmer code in an effort to identify the author. This could be used, for
example, in academic dishonesty detection of computer science classes or in tracing down
the creator of malware. For this model, it could be applied in hacker scenarios by attempting the authorship identification of code found on the machine in question. However, its
use in digital triage is limited by time and the availability of samples similar to the other
analysis techniques discussed.
Authorship attribution, although seemingly useful to digital forensics, does not appear
to be useful to this effort, and will not be explored further. The reviewed works indicate
the primary goal of authorship attribution is to identify a set of writing as coming from a
particular person typically using a pool of works from a set of likely individuals, and can
be a lengthy process involving training and comparison. There were variations from this
researched in the form of trying to identify some specific characteristic about the individual
such as the gender of the author[49]. This type of focused information might be useful in
digital triage if it can be performed in a timely manner, but it was still determined that, in
general, authorship attribution is not appropriate to this work.

2.3.2

Automated User Profiling

Simson Garfinkel ran a set of experiments using what he termed pseudo-unique identifiers like social security numbers, credit card numbers, and email addresses to perform
cross-drive analysis[24]. Cross-drive analysis in this case being the examination of drives
to try and determine what they might have in common and automatically identify drives
of interest. For example, identifying a set of hard drives which came from a set of users
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who are part of the same social network or work for the same corporation. During his
experiments he also examined single drives to try and determine if they had information
that violated user privacy and that should have been wiped before the drive was disposed.
In this work he also tried to determine who the primary user was based on their email
address. This was accomplished through the creation of a histogram of email addresses
found on each machine to determine the primary user based on the theory that the user’s
email address will appear more often than anyone else’s. His work was designed to be
used for case prioritization, but not necessarily during digital triage. However, the idea of
pseudo-unique object extraction, and primary user determination through the use of email
histograms could be very useful in computer profiling during digital triage.
A work published in 2009 entitled, Fast User Classifying to Establish Forensic Analysis Priorities comes closer to the goals of this dissertation[27]. In this work the authors
describe what they call the Five-Minute-Forensics technique. They first extract a limited
amount of information from a device, and then use it to rank the disks in question. Their
goal is to decrease the time to choose between multiple hard drives during an examination
and to avoid wasting time on data that is not useful. They first choose a small subset of
files to extract including user specific registry files and Web cache. Then, they use this
data along with the types of files found on the system to attempt to classify the user as:
occasional user, chat-internet user, office worker user, experience user, and hacker user.
The classification is determined by first training their system with hard drives of manually
pre-classified user hard drives. Where as this work served as inspiration, it does not sup-
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plant this dissertation effort as their model requires training. Time was not a consideration
as their goal did not involve digital triage.

2.4

Summary of Reviewed Works
This literary review looked at existing process models and discovered that no cur-

rent model includes a digital forensics triage process, but that the inclusion of one will
not interrupt current accepted practice. This review also searched for stand alone digital
triage process models and only discovered one the Computer Forensics Field Triage Process Model[33]. The concept of digital triage was also explored in current literature, and
it was shown that researchers are seeing the need for a digital triage process and call for
research in this area.
Support for the automated computer profiling phase of the process model was searched
for, and it was discovered there has been some work in user/computer profiling. However,
most existing techniques require either too much user intervention or were not intended for
use in digital triage and are thus too complicated or too time consuming for its use. However, these works did provide good inspiration and were useful during model development
and testing.
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CHAPTER 3
DIGITAL TRIAGE PROCESS MODEL

The primary contribution of this dissertation is the testing of a digital triage process
model. This chapter will describe that model in detail. First, an overview of the model will
be given. Then, a detailed description of each phase will be provided. Finally, a description
of how it could be used will be discussed. Chapter 4 describes the creation of the tool that
implements the automated portions of the model, and Chapter 5 will provide detail on how
this model was tested through the tool introduced in Chapter 4.

3.1

The Model
The model introduced in this chapter is a semi-linear framework. The model attempts

to allow for use by novices, incorporate ongoing concerns, and allow for specialization for
different crime classes. The most significant contribution of the model is its automated
phases shown in grey on Figure 3.1. Planning and Readiness is an on-going phase that
occurs pre-event, and Preservation is an umbrella activity that is needed throughout all
phases. The remaining phases are presented in a linear fashion. The dotted line on the
left of Figure 3.1 represents the information flow from the Computer Profile and Crime
Potential phase into the Presentation phase where it is transformed into usable information
for the digital triage examiner. Each phase will be described in detail.
35

Planning and Readiness
Live Forensics
Computer Profile
Preservation

Crime Potential
Presentation
Triage
Examination
Figure 3.1

Semi-automated Crime Specific Digital Triage Process Model

3.1.1

Planning and Readiness

Planning and Readiness is an ongoing phase involving the preparation and education
of staff, and the continual upgrading of equipment. Including a phase like this in a digital
triage process is particularly important as it involves the continual testing of the triage tools
and the effort to stay current on all hardware that the triage examiner may encounter.
The need to stay current with technology will always be an important part of any digital
forensics process. New technology can often leave booby traps for the uninformed. For
example, in Chapter 2 a work was mentioned by G. Bell et al. In this work it was shown
that some solid state drives will start to erase unallocated space without any user interaction
disrupting the authentication process by being powered on[5].
This work has minimal effect on the model described here, but issues like this can
damage a case if a digital triage examiner is not aware of them. The digital triage examiner
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could wipe space that a complete examination could extract data from, regardless of the
write blocking technology applied, just by applying power to the suspect’s drive. If the
triage exam is conducted after the evidence is processed, the triage examiner could disrupt
authentication. The digital triage examiner can record their actions properly and account
for the loss of authentication later if aware of the danger. If completely unaware of this
danger, it is very likely their authentication will be corrupted. Planning and Readiness
involves preparing for these situations.

3.1.2

Live Forensics

Live forensics involves the acquisition of volatile memory, and it is included as a phase
of this model as an optional step dependent on need and expertise. Digital evidence should
be gathered in the order of volatility to prevent the loss of any data of evidentiary value[23].
Thus, this step has to come before anything else in any digital forensic process to preserve
volatile memory, but it is presently skipped in most investigations and the volatile memory
typically ignored. It is most commonly used during incident response to attempt a determination of how a machine was compromised. It is also commonly used on live evidence
when full disk encryption is suspected to acquire evidence before the machine is powered
down or for password cracking later. Therefore, live forensics is likely to become more
important and more common as users become familiar with and operating systems come
standard with full disk encryption[17, 28].
The reasoning for including it as a phase in this model is that once the digital triage
process begins volatile memory will be lost. A digital triage tool is either going to require
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a system reboot into a safe environment using boot media which will destroy all volatile
memory or the running of a program from an external drive which will cause partial damage. In either case volatile memory will have been altered. The input from this phase will
not be applied to the automated process.

3.1.3

Computer Profile

Computer profile generation will be the first phase in the automated process for the
digital triage process model. In the Field Triage Process model the authors attempt to
learn about the users of a system by targeting the user profiles on the computer[33]. The
Five Minute Forensics Technique performed a similar analysis, but used the information to
categorize the users into occasional user, chat-internet user, office worker user, experienced
user, and hacker user[27]. The Semi-automated Crime Specific Digital Triage Process
Model attempts to refine these process models by stream lining the process, implementing
it in an automated fashion, and including customization for different crime classes in the
form of a red flag report.
This phase involves the gathering of three types of information. First, general file
system data is gathered. This allows the examiner to quickly see what type of and how
much data is present. Basic file system information can also be used to get a feel for the
complexity of the drive, and possibly the complexity of the user. Next file type statistics
are gathered for the complete volume and for the individual user directories when possible.
This allows the examiner to theorize about the primary usage of the drive. Web history is
then gathered in an attempt to reveal a user’s interest, communications, and recent activity.
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Finally in the case of Windows machines, the registry is searched for. The registry is a
gold mine of quick useful information. More detail concerning this information gathering
process is provided in chapter 4.
In the case of external storage or computers that are not connected to the Internet, the
only results will be file system information and file statistics. Further searches could be incorporated involving the search of document metadata or other items of interest. However,
at present, profiling of external media will provide less results for this model. This phase
is summarized in Table 3.1. Summaries will also be provided for the Crime Potential,
Presentation, and Digital Triage phase as they are the primary focus of the model.
Table 3.1
Computer Profile Phase Summary
Name:
Description:

Computer Profile
First automated phase, builds a general profile
of the computer
Input:
Physical disks desired for analysis
Precondition: Authorization to search the system (warrant,
consent to search, corporate authorization letter
etc.), system booted into a safe Linux environment
Postcondition: Computer profile data stream created
Product:
Data stream of information collected
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3.1.4

Crime Potential

The Computer Profiling phase just described will be the same for every piece of media
examined. In contrast, the Crime Potential phase contains those components that are dependent on a specific crime class. It will attempt to guide the triage examiner by raising
red flags for a specific crime class. Although listed as a separate phase, it runs concurrently
with the computer profiling stage to save time.
Different crimes will call for different template contents. Child pornographers are
likely to hoard and collect images leading to a large ratio of image files to total files on
their machine[36]. Therefore, a large percentage of image files might be a red flag when
performing triage on a piece of media. A hacker is likely to have a large number of scripts
and executables. Both crime classes have certain commonly used key words associated
with each that can be searched. Crime templates will need to be developed for each crime
class. This template would help identify those items of particular interest in a given class of
crime such as certain file types or particular key words. This type of crime class modeling
has already been identified as an important area of research at the 42nd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences[43].
This template could become more advanced over time to include additional processes
and filtering per crime class or more advanced filtering could be incorporated depending
on the time critical nature of the examination. For example, it could be useful to be able
to apply flesh tone filtering to images during child pornography cases such as done by the
first responder tool File Hound[19, 26]. For the purposes of this dissertation, a very simple
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template will be used to demonstrate the usefulness of the model involving filtering with
keywords.
Table 3.2
Proposed Standard Crime Template
Keywords
File Type Alerts

words of particular interest in the crime class
file types that would normally be found on a
computer for a specific crime class
Known File Alerts known files to be of interest in a specific crime
class

This crime template allows for the search for both known files, by name, and keywords.
Some types of criminal subcultures such as child pornographers, hackers, or fraudsters
have their own unique slang that can be searched for. There are also image files that are
commonly collected by child pornographers that are part of unique sets, and certain hacker
tools that might commonly be found on a hacker’s computer. These files can be searched
for by name or if time is available by the more robust method of mathematical hash value.
Unless altered, these files will always produce the same hash value providing a way to
red flag them no matter what they are named. These commonly used words and known
file hash values are already being used by some digital forensics tools during analysis and
examination. For example, the National Institute of Standards and Technologies(NIST)
maintains the National Software Reference Library which includes hash values for standard
programs and those that are malicious in nature[1].
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File type alerts are another category covered by the crime template shown in Table 3.1.
A preponderance of certain file types could also be a strong indicator of certain activity. A
child pornographer is likely to have a lot of image files, a hacker a lot of scripts and code,
and a fraudster a lot of numerical based files and financial records. These statistics can be
further divided into categories of files such as audio, video, documents, etc to help with
intelligence gathering[27].
When choosing or designing a template a triage examiner must take into consideration
the location the triage will occur. Will it take place in the field, in the office, or in the
examination laboratory? The digital triage examiner must consider the time critical nature
of the case. The more extensive the template the longer the automated process is likely to
take. The digital triage examiner should also consider any legal ramifications. A warrant
allowing the digital triage examiner to search for evidence of a murder does not allow the
search for child pornography as well. See Table 3.3 for some example templates. See Table
3.4 for a summary of the Crime Potential phase.
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Table 3.3
Example Crime Templates
Example Template Child Pornography
Keywords
commonly used words by child pornographer
collectors, known victims, known child porn
image names
File Type Alerts
Image files
Known File Alerts Known child porn images
Example Template
Keywords
File Type Alerts
Known File Alerts

Murder Investigation
words associated with the case
none
none

Example Template
Keywords
File Type Alerts
Known file Alerts

Suspected Hacker
known hacker words and phrases
scripts, executables
known root kits, known hacker tools, nonstandard user software

Table 3.4
Crime Potential Phase Summary
Name:
Description:

Crime Potential
Second automated phase, uses key words to filter the computer profile information created in
the previous phase
Input:
Data stream from the Computer Profile phase
Precondition: Computer Profile phase completion
Postcondition: All data filtered and organized
Product:
Additional data stream of filtered information
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3.1.5

Presentation

In this phase the information from the User Analysis and the Crime Potential phase
will be translated into a report that can quickly guide the digital triage examiner to items of
interest or help quickly determine how the evidence should be prioritized. The results will
be interpreted and applied according to need. If detailed enough, the examiner may be able
to skip the next phase entirely saving time and effort. The utility created to test this model
creates a simple HTML report divided into a main report that is unfiltered and a red flag
report that only contains those items filtered by the Crime Potential phase. HTML reports
are common to digital forensics examiners already and provide a dynamic environment
useful for viewing evidence. More detail about the contents of the report can be found in
Chapter 4, and a report sample can be found in Appendix A. See Table 3.5 for a summary
of the Presentation phase.
Table 3.5
Presentation Phase Summary
Name:
Description:

Presentation
The third and final automated phase, organizes
all reporting information
Input:
Data Streams from Computer Profile and Crime
Potential phases
Precondition: Crime Potential phase completion
Postcondition: Report generated and presented to the user
Product:
HTML report separated into a main report for
the Computer Profile phase data stream and a
filtered report for the Crime potential phase data
stream(see Appendix A for an example)
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3.1.6

Triage Examination

The triage examination phase is the viewing of the evidence in a forensically safe manner using the guidance provided by the Presentation phase. This phase is optional dependent on need. If the Presentation phase produced enough information, then there will be
no need for further examination.
This phase is different from a traditional examination. Typically, after the evidence is
duplicated in a traditional digital forensic examination, the forensic software will assist in
indexing, sorting, and categorizing all files and file fragments. One analogy is that of a
filing cabinet being emptied and all the files sorted and categorized into separate stacks
so the examiner can quickly locate information. The triage examination occurs prior to
this duplication and sorting. Essentially in this phase the triage examiner is viewing the
file system as it would be presented to the user in a file system explorer application. Any
sorting or searching has to be done in real time by the triage examiner. In triage examination the examiner is looking through the filing cabinet to see if anything is readily apparent
guided by the information provided in the Presentation phase.
Triage examination is not a new concept, but the addition of an automated process using
predefined templates specific to each crime class is a new concept. This triage examination
phase would be what typically occurs when an examiner uses any tool on the suspect
media for information gathering purposes prior to evidence duplication. The automation
and the guidance provided by this model will, however, make this phase more successful
or unnecessary if the desired information is already in the produced report. See Table 3.6
for a summary of this phase.
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Table 3.6
Digital Triage Examination Phase Summary
Name:
Description:

Digital Triage Examination
This is a manual phase and not necessary if all
desired information is present in the report produced by the presentation phase
Input:
Report produced by the Presentation phase
Precondition: Presentation phase completion
Postcondition: None
Product:
Digital triage assessment

3.1.7

Preservation

Preservation is an overarching requirement for any activity involving digital evidence.
During every phase of the process the triage examiner must insure that no change is made.
The technology, software and hardware, exists to prevent any writing to the media under examination. If the media is being examined through the use of an examination machine, then a hardware write blocker must be in place between the source media and the
examination machine. If the triage examiner is unable to remove the hard drive or a examination machine is not on site, then a tested live boot CD such as Helix(http://www.efense.com/products.php) can be utilized to boot the system into a safe environment.
In both cases since the original evidence was accessed, whatever process is used to do
the triage will have to be recorded and that record will have to follow the evidence through
the traditional forensics process if one is applied.
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3.2

Digital Triage Process Model Usage
Digital triage and this process model both have different purposes depending on the

location of the media being examined and whether the examination is being conducted on
live or dead evidence. Digital evidence is going to be in one of three places the field, the
office, or the laboratory. In the field digital triage can be used to provide feedback to the
search and seizure team, to gather quick information, and for use in suspect interviews.
A lot of local law enforcement agencies do not have their own digital forensics lab.
If a piece of media is located at the law enforcement office waiting to be sent off for
examination, it might be wise to first perform triage to determine if it is even worth sending
in. If it is determined through the use of this process that it is unlikely that evidence is
present, then perhaps the investigators will want to concentrate their search for evidence
in other areas and not wait on an exam. The simplicity of this process allows for its use in
such a situation where training is limited.
A digital triage process that assists in prioritization would be extremely helpful in increasing efficiency for digital forensics laboratories. For most digital forensic labs, working off a backlog has become the common practice. It is important for digital forensic labs
to be able to prioritize cases based on the available evidence, and in some circumstances
even to refuse to accept cases until their backlog is reduced. The automation described in
this model can make it fast enough to be useful in this type of situation.
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3.2.1

Common Digital Triage Scenarios

A commonly mentioned use for digital triage is that of a kidnapping case due to the
need for a speedy turn-around. In this situation the primary source of evidence is typically already known, and the digital triage examiner already knows what to look for. The
template could however contain keywords to determine what chat programs are installed,
and key registry entries that will report passwords for chat programs and most recently
accessed files. Knowing this knowledge ahead of time will assist the digital triage examiner in more quickly obtaining the specific information needed in the Triage Examination
phase.
Another commonly discussed use of digital triage is that of a soldier in the theater of
war. In this type of situation automation and simplicity of use is vital. The solider may have
limited training in the use of the tool, and speed is always important to a soldier in combat.
One scenario could be a soldier who needs to quickly locate media that was involved in
a suspected terrorist activity. Utilizing this model could quickly allow the solider to determine which computer among many contains the primary source of intelligence needed.
See Table 3.7.
Table 3.7
Terrorist Activity Template
Example Template Terrorist Activity
Keyword List
known terrorist groups, known terrorists, bomb
parts
File Type Alerts
ArcInfo (mapping software), AutoCad
Know File Alerts
known steganography programs
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3.2.2

Digital Triage Trade-offs

The analysis performed in the Computer Profiling and Crime Potential phases calls for
the analysis of URLs, a search of keywords, an analysis of file types, and a search for
known files. There will need to be some trade-off analysis conducted. The more thorough
the searches, the longer the process will take.
One trade-off considered will be whether these keywords should be searched for within
all present files, just through the file names, or within certain file types. The hashing of
all files to determine if they are a known file will take considerable time as well. Known
file searches can be sped up by just searching for known file names. This would not be as
accurate as hashing every file, but would provide considerable speed up. In both of these
situations, the tradeoff will be between looking at the file names or file contents.
The inclusion of additional processing as briefly mentioned will also be a metric to
consider. Additional processes provide additional automated intelligence, but it also provides increased processing time, and more time for triage examiner to decipher the report
results. For the actual model testing, a more generalized approach can be taken without
additional processing options sticking to the simple standard template described in Table
3.2.
There can be two types of scans that could be performed on a drive during digital triage,
a surface scanning looking only at present files in allocated space and a deep scan searching
through unallocated and allocated space. Both of these ideas were originally considered
for possible trade-off analysis. The idea of doing a deep scan was quickly discarded during
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initial development. This type of analysis would be too time intensive to be of use in digital
triage.
All of these speed versus completeness trade-offs are greatly dependent on situation.
For example, if a triage examiner is in the field then speed is probably a very high priority.
All searches can be reduced to file name searches, and all known file searches could be
limited to searching for the names of the files instead of the hash values. If the triage
examiner is back in the laboratory and using digital triage to sort cases, then speed might
be less of an issue and the examiner can perform the searches using the file contents as well
as the file names. The ability to adjust these parameters will be important to the design of
the utility that implements the proposed model.
Some trade-off analysis will be done to determine the correct amount of information to
be gathered for experimental purposes. The more information gathered by the automated
process the faster the triage process should occur, but the greater the time penalty for
running the triage model. It will have to be determined how much time can reasonably be
spent during the digital triage process during model testing.
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CHAPTER 4
IMPLEMENTING THE AUTOMATION TOOL

Before the model described in this dissertation could be tested, it had to be implemented
[9]. This chapter describes the creation of a utility developed to facilitate the testing of
the proposed model by implementing its automated phases as shown in grey in Figure
3.1. This utility will be referred to as the FMPU for Fast Modular Previewing Utility. (A
manuscript concerning FMPU implementation has been accepted for publication by the
Journal of Digital Forensics Security and Law September 2012.) Appendix A contains a
sample report from a test run for the FMPU. Samples of all report sections mentioned in
this chapter can be viewed there.

4.1

Tool Development
Any intelligence gathering process should be efficient, fast, and as automated as pos-

sible to be a successful digital triage process. A series of scripts that gather quick useful
information for digital previewing were developed to facilitate the testing of the proposed
model. These scripts contain original code, native Linux commands, and open source tools.
The goal was to create an automated tool that could quickly profile a computer for use in
digital triage. The development and publication of such a utility serves several goals in
addition to the testing of the digital triage process model.
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1. Determine what information can be gathered quickly from a computer in an automated fashion
2. Add support for the use of digital triage in digital forensics by showing how such a
tool can be created
3. Demonstrate a modular framework that can be used by others in the creation of their
own tools

The first decision to be made was what information to collect. Some information is
universally useful, and the usefulness of other information is dependent on the type of case
under examination. There have been calls for research into crime class modeling and research for the gathering of digital forensics corpora that will make this type of modeling
possible, but the scientific community still has a long way to go[43, 25]. Therefore, for
initial development it was decided to explore what can already be quickly gathered using
existing open source tools and scripted using existing commands. Further research in modeling digital triage per class of crime being investigated could assist in refining the utility
and defining what additional tools need to be built. The FMPU can serve as a base for such
research.

4.1.1

Testing Environment

When selecting a testing and development environment the following requirements
were outlined:
1. Digital triage must avoid changing the evidence when examining a dead system
2. It should be possible to perform digital triage in the lab, in the office, or in the field
3. Some form of boot media must be used to incorporate full onsite capability
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With these requirements in mind, the Linux distribution CAINE installed to a USB
drive was chosen as the development and testing environment. It is already designed as a
digital forensics tool and can be installed on a USB drive allowing for the use of read-write
media instead of write-once optical media which is also a common distribution method
for forensic Linux distributions. Using USB drives for the FMPU vehicle may restrict its
use on older machines that do not allow for USB boot. However, transfer from USB boot
media to optical media would not be a difficult process. The CAINE Linux distribution
was used for development, testing, and for the final vehicle of the utility.

4.1.2

Programming Language and Program Structure

On of the requirements decided on during development of the FMPU was the ability
to quickly parse text. With this requirement in mind, Perl was chosen as the language of
choice. Perl is well known for its text parsing ability and is already included in the CAINE
distribution requiring no modification of the CAINE environment. Perl proved to be a wise
selection as it easily facilitated the development of the FMPU.
Another advantage of using a scripting language like Perl is the ease of which it allows
the utility to be expanded without the need to recompile the executable allowing a single
user or a group to easily add to it. Perl also facilitates the modular design of the FMPU.
This modular design is implemented through the following procedure:
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1. Main module accepts as input: report name, report location, and module list (optional)
2. Main module writes HTML header
3. Main module gives control over to 1st module on the provided list
4. Module 1 extracts information
5. Module 1 formats information as text, HTML table or separate Web page
6. Module 1 appends HTML table, link, or text to report
7. Main module creates HTML footer to close the report

Steps 3 - 6 are repeated for each module on the provided list or as applicable. For
example, if it is determined that the system does not have an operating system installed on
it, then certain modules will be skipped such as Windows registry extraction. Expansion
of the program is now a simple matter of creating the new module; placing it in the same
folder as the other modules; making sure the output is in the form of an HTML table, link,
or plain text; and adding its name to the list to be run. RegRipper discussed in the User and
Application Information section is designed in a similar modular fashion and also written
in Perl.

4.2

FMPU Functionality
Data extraction starts with disk information where it examines the physical and log-

ical disk information as well as file system information. It then looks at the files on the
system by examining the quantities of file types that are being stored. Finally, it looks at
specific user information recorded by the operating system and applications. Each of these
categories will be discussed in detail.
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4.2.1

General File System Information Extraction

Taking inspiration from Brian Carrier in his book, “File System Analysis,” the utility
was designed to extract file system information at different physical disk and file system
levels [10]. General file system information can assist in triage by allowing an investigator
to quickly determine how many disks are installed in the system, the size of such disks,
and the complexity of the partitioning system on the disks.
At the highest level, a digital triage examiner needs to know what physical disks are
on the system and how many partitions are on each disk. This is quickest and easiest of
all the information sets to obtain. Most modern Linux systems identify this information
during boot up and create mount points in the /dev folder for each physical device and each
partition. A simple listing of this folder for mount points starting with “hd” or “sd” will
provide the information. A change in the letter following the “hd” or “sd” will indicate
the number of physical drives. For example, a system listing sda, sdb, sdc will have three
physical devices recognized by the system. There are other ways of acquiring this information, the Linux command “fdisk -l” for example. However, the method just describes
produces simple output that can easily be parsed for the final FMPU report.
There should also be a mount point for each partition indicated with a number at the
end of the name. For example, a system listing sda1, sda2 would have a physical device
referenced with sda that has two partitions labeled 1 and 2. This information can be found
by running the command “ls /dev.” There are other things in this folder as well, but filtering the output with another common utility called grep and searching for the letters “sd” or
“hd” quickly displays the desired information. The final commands would look something
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like this:

• ls /dev/ — grep hd.
• ls /dev/ — grep sd.

If a bootable thumb drive is used as a final vessel for the FMPU such as in the testing
environment, it will also be necessary to identify which label the thumb drive is given
as well to avoid including the thumb drive information in the final output. This option
was included in the FMPU prototype to allow for this. However, it might be wiser to
avoid having to include this option so as not to confuse the novice digital triage examiner.
Providing the tool in an optical media format instead will address the danger.
The sector layout of the disk and the file system label of each volume is determined
using the Sleuth Kits mmls command as shown in Table 2. This quickly allows the digital
triage examiner to locate possible hidden areas on the disk by making note of large amounts
of unallocated space, the complexity of the disk layout, the potential for data recovery, and
some hint of the expertise of the user. The amount of data recovery possible is dependent on
the file system used to store the data. For example, Windows FAT file systems are notorious
for leaving data remnants behind, but Linux based file systems are designed in such a way
that data remnants are more quickly over-written[10]. Also, a disk with multiple types of
file systems or file systems that are less commonly used could indicate a more advanced
user that is willing to experiment with different file systems instead of a user who sticks
with the file system preinstalled on the media.
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Table 4.1
Sample output from Sleuth Kit mmls command

00:
01:
02:
03:
04:

Slot
Meta
—–
00:00
00:01
—–

Start
0000000000
0000000000
0000002048
0001257472
1953523120

End
0000000000
0000002047
0001257471
1953523119
1953525167

Length
0000000001
0000002048
0001255424
1952265648
0000002048

Size
0512B
0001M
0613M
0930G
0001M

Description
Primary Table (0)
Unallocated
NTFS (0x07)
NTFS (0x07)
Unallocated

Essentially from this report, an examiner can see how many partitions are on the system, the file system types, and if there is any space that is not allocated to a partition. The
file system type, for those who are more versed in technology, will be an indication of how
advanced the user is, the type of information that is on the system, and large amounts of
space not allocated to a partition could indicate data hiding. Further research and development can be done to produce additional output indicating red flags whenever there is an
above normal amount of unallocated space or when a file system type that is not common
is identified. The Sleuth Kit command fsstat can provide a lot of additional detail concerning the file system, but the only other item included in the FMPU prototype final report is
fsstats attempt to guess the operating system on each volume.

4.2.2

File System Metadata Information

File system metadata refers to the reviewing of the system metadata of all files located
on the system, not to be mistaken with internal file metadata such as EXIF information in
JPEGs or user information in Microsoft Office products. File system metadata can provide
clues to what the computer has been used for. A media machine will most likely have a
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large number of media files. A machine used more for work is more likely to contain more
documents and spreadsheets.
The Sleuth Kit suite of tools also includes a tool called sorter that will classify all files
on a system. The idea behind sorter was used, but the tool itself proved too time intensive
to utilize in the FMPU. The file classification report produced by the FMPU is instead
compiled using native Linux commands. The determination of file type can be done in
two different ways. All files are in essence binary data and the examination of this binary
data can often be used to identify the file. What makes a file useful is the program used to
interpret that binary data into something useful to the user. Windows machines use the two
or three letters following the last period in a file name, commonly called the file extension,
to determine what program to use for this interpretation. These last three letters can also
be used to identify the file type.
Using naming conventions for file type identification has a disadvantage. Windows
operating systems typically do not use any verification of file type against the file name.
This means nothing prohibits the user from renaming a file to any incorrect file extension.
There is also the possibility of a glitch in the system resulting in files having an incorrect
extension. For these reasons, digital forensics programs typically depend on the first few
internal bytes of a file to determine the true file type.
The FMPU divides the output for file classification information by Windows user directory and by entire volumes. In addition, the user can select first byte signature identification
or file extension identification for user directories and volumes independently. The choice
of one technique over the other is dependent on the time critical nature of the situation.
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As explained, a first byte signature analysis is more trustworthy. However each time a
file is identified by signature, its first bytes have to be compared to a list of known byte
signatures. This list needs to be extensive to be useful.
In the initial tests byte signature analysis performed on user directories added three
minutes of processing time on the testing machine. Doing full byte signature analysis on
complete volumes with Windows 7 installations increased this time to over twenty minutes
due to the number of files that had to be classified. Full byte signature analysis on nonWindows operating system volumes varied by the amount of files stored on the drive.
The compromise adopted was to set the tool by default to do full byte analysis when it
encounters a user directory, but to perform file extension analysis when it encounters a
complete volume. During later testing, this was changed to file extension analysis for
both user directory and volume to facilitate faster testing. This is digital triage not a full
examination. Therefore, the sacrifice is acceptable.
Time line information was originally considered as another system metadata category
to explore, but it experienced the same slow-down issue. Creating a sorted list of file times
for specific directories is reasonable, but creating a listing of an entire drive proved too
time-consuming. In addition, the report generated could not be summarized leading to the
amount of data the digital examiner has to sort through being beyond reasonable for digital
triage in the field or in the lab. Therefore even if time were available, creating a timeline
of all files on the drive is unreasonable. Just as with everything in a criminal investigation,
the type of analysis that is needed is greatly dependent on the situation. Sometimes it is
necessary to identify every activity that occurred within a given window of time. With this
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time window as a limiting factor the amount of data can become more reasonable. This,
however, moves from the realm of digital triage into analysis. For the final utility the time
line information was excluded, but can be easily added as an additional module utilizing
existing tools in non-digital-triage situations.

4.2.3

User and Application Information

User information is simply the user information recorded by the file system or an application usually without the casual user knowing it. For example, the user created username
for each user on the system is created by the operating system itself. Application information is the information created for the user during application use. This information is
specific to the application and the operating system being examined. For testing purposes,
the concentration was on making tools to search for application information on the Windows environment. However since the tool is run from a Linux boot disk, it would not
be difficult to add additional modules to look for artifacts more common to the Apple or
Linux environments. After developing such a module, one only has to update the tool to
execute the application information module specific to the operating system or application
on the system under evaluation.
First, research had to be conducted to determine what user specific information should
be collected. In Simpson Garfinkels paper, “Forensic Feature Extraction and Cross-Drive
Analysis” one of the techniques explored is the identification of the primary user of a
computer by creating a histogram of all the email addresses on the system[24]. This type
of analysis matches very closely the goals of this project, and the incorporation of this idea
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was explored during tool development. However, this technique was designed for detailed
analysis not triage. For now, it proved to add too much additional time to the analysis. It is
hoped, the idea can be incorporated in some form later.
The idea of feature extraction for profiling was adapted in a different form. During
file classification the reports are divided by volume and by user directory. At the end of
each link is a number representing the number of file types identified at that level. At a
glance the digital triage examiner can quickly determine which volume and which user
account has had the most use by looking at the number of file types identified. This is not
a guaranteed method, but it can provide some indication. The Web links work in a similar
fashion. They are divided by user directory, and a number is provided at the end of the
link showing how much history or how many domains are listed. See Appendix A for an
example report.
Rogers et al. in their work Computer Forensic Field Triage Process Model discuss the
gathering of user specific information for field digital triage[33]. Their model did serve as
inspiration. However, their work does not suggest automation as this utility does. Their
work concentrated more on identifying and modeling the types of information that should
be sought. They were not concerned with creating an automated utility. The FMPU does
extract similar sets of data as the data described in their work such as Web history and
Windows registry information.
On a volume with user directories, usernames for each user are collected by looking at
the user directories as listed on the system. This can provide an indication of how many
users are on the system and possibly the identity of those users. However, the digital triage
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examiner must remember that there is no easy way to tell who is actually using which account. It is also important to note, user directories can be placed in non-standard locations
eliminating this benefit. However, for more advanced FMPU users the configuration file
can be edited to restore this benefit by specifying the user directory location.
The first version of this utility also incorporated two other sets of information as its target: the Windows registry and Internet Explorer history. The Windows registry was chosen
because of the wealth of information that can be quickly obtained from its examination.
Several works discuss the structure of the Windows registry and the creation of tools to
examine it [14, 22]. However instead of creating a tool from scratch, it was decided to
incorporate the existing tool RegRipper. RegRipper is a tool maintained and provided free
of charge by Harlan Carvey [15]. The FMPU calls the tool to extract information and provides the results in the final report. Registry file information is separated by volume and by
each user. The information about the entire system was produced by examining the SOFTWARE, and SYSTEM registry files. Information for each user is gathered by examining
each users NTUSER.DAT file.
The data to be extracted was based on what is possible, what is already coded as RegRipper plugins, and what would be the most useful during a digital triage situation. The
following was selected as an initial set of information to extract for testing:
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Per User Information Extracted:
• Logon name of the user used to verify the user list
• Websites typed directly into a Web browser
• Recently opened documents
• Recently run items from the command line box
• Media Player recently played files
• AOL Instant Messenger information
• Skype communication program settings
• Yahoo Instant Messenger settings
• MSN messenger settings
System Information:
• List of USB devices that have been attached to the system
• Shut down counts and times
Software Information:
• The default browser
This selective extraction is dependent on which plugins are called during execution.
The creation of these plugins is an ongoing project supported by the developer. Newly
developed plugins can be added to the RegRipper program by adding the plugin files to a
specific directory in the RegRipper program directory. The selection of which plugins to
run for the FMPU is done through an input file. Plugins can be added or removed to the
report through the editing of this simple input file.
The second piece of information retrieved is Web browsing history. In order to facilitate
future Web browsing, the default on most Web browsers is to keep a record of what sites
63

a user has visited. Unless a user changes this setting, a Web history is maintained. Thus,
internet history can provide a lot of information about the user such as what email accounts
they use, what Web searches they have been performing, and other personal habits. There
are various Web browsers, and each keeps a history file in its own format and in its own
location.
Internet Explorer history was chosen over other browsers for the prototype because it
comes standard on Windows computers and is arguably the most popular Web browser
in use today (http://marketshare.hitslink.com/). Further expansion of the FMPU should
include modules for additional Web browsers. Internet Explorer stores its history in the
index.dat file located in the user directory [44]. Reverse engineering its file format is a
simple matter as there are plenty of published works that have laid the foundation work
[31, 32]. Along with the Web page visited by the user, the index.dat file also contains the
time the Web page was visited, whether it was intentional or a redirect and the associated
cached item located in the history folder.
The purpose of the FMPU is to selectively collect those items that are of the most interest to the digital examiner and provide the information in a useful fashion. The goal
of the FMPU is not to present all the possible data. Therefore, a similar approach to
what was done with the file type analysis was also performed for the Web browser history
analysis. Instead of listing all the URLs and all the information about the URLs, each
domain visited is counted. For example, if a user visits www.Website.com/link2 and then
www.Website.com/link1 the FMPU will only record www.Website.com, 2. The final list-
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ing is then sorted by number and sent to the output. The raw output used to create this list
is also included in the report in case the triage examiner needs more detail.
Presenting the data in this manner allows the triage examiner to quickly determine what
Websites have been visited and to what depth or frequency. A single visit to a Website could
indicate a redirect or accident. A higher number will indicate multiple recorded visits or
a much deeper exploration of the Website. Number does not always signify importance
however. A Website visited a single time might be an important clue or the same Website
visited multiple times may not record each visit. Thus, lower on the list does not necessarily
indicate less importance to the examiner.

4.3

Red Flag Report
The primary purpose behind the creation of the FMPU is to facilitate the testing of

the model proposed in this dissertation. The three phases the FMPU will implement are
Computer Profile, Crime Potential and Presentation. The idea of the Crime Potential phase
is to allow customization based on the class of crime being investigated. Crime class
customization is an open area for research, and there are not a lot of available testing sets.
With real evidence restricted from civilian access, it will be hard to develop any for future
works[43, 25].
The red flag report is generated by filtering using a list of red flag key words chosen
before executing the FMPU. All information is filtered by this red flag list and included
in a separate report similar to the main report generated by the utility. For example, file
names are gathered as part of the file type quantification analysis. These file names are run
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through the red flag list and any file name that has as part of its name a red flag word will
be listed in the red flag report. A similar process is done during the gathering of Website
history.
In this way, a digital triage examiner can quickly find information based on crime class.
A similar process is carried out with most commercial forensic tools. In a commercial
tool this process will typically take one of two forms. Either files will be identified by
hash value or keywords will be searched for throughout the disk. Inclusion of either of
these options would be too time intensive. The idea to search only the information that is
being gathered is an ideal compromise for digital triage. The creation of standard red flag
keyword lists would be a great area for further development.

4.3.1

Semi-automated Crime Specific Digital Triage Process Model Implemented

The primary purpose for creating the FMPU was to implement the automated phases
of the Semi-automated Crime Specific Digital Triage Process Model. Those automated
phases are Computer Profile, Crime Potential, and Presentation. The Computer Profile
stage calls for the extraction of logical and physical disk layout, file system information,
and application information. As shown above, the FMPU does extract all this information.
The Crime Potential phase is meant to help the examiner focus the triage on the specific
class of crime. This is implemented through the use of a red flag filter. This filter watches
all data for keywords previously entered by the examiner and moves any data item it finds
into an alert report for viewing. The other profiling mentioned in the model introduction
was that of significant amounts of a particular file type(s). The FMPU gathers and counts
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all file types on each volume then sorts the output by number of occurrences. A quick
glance at the top of this report will provide this information. The digital triage examiner can
determine from their template the type of files that should cause concern and by viewing
the report see which volumes has the largest quantities of this file type. There is no current
data on what an average user has on their computer as far as file types. Therefore, there
is no current automated way to red flag solely based on the number of files on the system.
The digital triage examiner will have to use their own template specific to the case under
examination.
The Presentation phase is the presentation of the results in a useful manner that can
help guide the digital triage examiner in their efforts. The FMPU produces this report in
the form of easy to navigate HTML pages. HTML is already commonly used for digital
forensic reports and allows for the easy inclusion of the text reports produced by the FMPU.
For an example of the FMPU report see Appendix A.

4.4

FMPU Future Work
This first iteration of the FMPU was a prototype with presets chosen by the designer.

Possible future upgrades for this utility could include:
• Default settings chosen in a more scientific manner
• Multiple Web browser support
• Option for a deeper file or sector scan
• Live system option
The selection of which file type classification to do, first byte or naming convention,
and which registry keys to extract was made based on the developers experience and in67

formal interviews with currently working digital forensics examiners. Experiments were
carried out with these settings and have the goal of testing the usefulness of the tool and the
methodology it helps to implement. Once the value of the tool is verified, further testing
should be carried out to better determine what default settings are the most useful. With
file type determination there is an element of processing time that has to be evaluated, and
with the registry keys there is the consideration of how much information is too much as it
contributes to user evaluation time.
The FMPU was designed to find and extract Web browser history for Internet Explorer.
There are, of course, other Web browser options available to each user. A more comprehensive scan would include the search for these Web browsers as well. Also, currently
the FMPU only extracts the URLs listed in the history. Another question that needs to
be explored is the usefulness of including the other information such as time stamps and
direct connection versus redirect information. The goal of the FMPU is to stream line all
information to facilitate quick digital triage decisions.
For keyword searches, the thoroughness of scans can be divided into 3 levels. The
FMPU looks only at the information already being gathered when building its alert report,
for example file names and Web history. This could be considered a level 1 scan. A
level 2 scan would also include the scan for words inside files. A level 2 scan would
take considerably more time. How much time would be dependent on the number of files
present on the system. A level 3 scan would be a sector-by-sector search for keywords.
Level 3 scans would take the most time, and be time dependent on the drive size itself.
Level 1 scanning was chosen based on the idea that digital triage has to be as quick as
68

possible to be useful. This is certainly true when performed in the field. The other two
situations already mentioned were, in the office for determining if a full examination is
warranted, or in the lab for case prioritization decisions. These situations are not as time
critical and what level of scan that would be the most useful would be an interesting area
for future work as well.
Digital triage can be performed on either live or dead evidence. Live evidence would
be considered an operating system that is currently running, and dead is one where the
system is controlled by a digital forensic entity such as a separate analysis machine or
an operating system booted from external media. Currently the FMPU only functions
on dead media having been developed from the Linux bootable distribution CAINE. The
analysis techniques used by the FMPU are applicable to a live system, but will not currently
function in a Windows environment. Also, any live analysis tool should be run in as small
of a footprint as possible. This was not a concern during the creation of the FMPU. Future
work could be to create a live port of this tool.
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CHAPTER 5
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

Chapter 3 introduced the Semi-automated Crime Specific Digital Triage Process Model[9].
Chapter 4 discussed how the model was realized through the creation of the FMPU. This
chapter describes the experimental design for the proposed hypothesis, the statistical analysis of the results, and presents the results of testing. Final conclusions are presented in
chapter 6.
Mississippi State Institutional Review Board approval was received before any experiments were performed. Dixie State College Institutional Review Board board approval was
obtained prior to performing experiments at the Southwest Regional Cyber Crime Institute.

5.1

Testing Plan
The hypothesis proposed in this dissertation is that the speed it takes to make an as-

sessment during digital triage can be decreased by at least 50% with the use of the digital
triage process introduced in this dissertation, and the digital triage process proposed will
not decrease the accuracy rate of the decisions made during digital triage.
After dividing the testing subjects into separate trials, it was also decided to address
whether or not expertise had an effect on time and accuracy as the groups naturally fell

70

into categories of expertise while assigning subjects to trials. See Table 5.1 for a summary
of experiments.
Table 5.1
Experiment Summary
Hypothesis

The use of the proposed model during digital
triage will decrease the time it takes to perform
digital triage, as digital triage is defined in this
proposal, by at least 50% without decreasing
the accuracy of decisions made during digital
triage.
Independent Variables The report produced by FMPU and subject expertise
Dependent Variables
The accuracy and speed of the decision made
by the subject
Constants
The digital media sets used to make a decision
and the case scenarios
Groups
Testing group consisting of an experimental
group and control group; validation group consisting of subjects who are qualified examiners
Statistical Method
Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA)

5.1.1

Testing Group Primary Separation

There were two primary groups of test subjects, a testing group and a validation group.
The validation group was a small group of individuals used for validating the tool on real
evidence and consisted of fully qualified examiners. (Fully qualified examiner was defined
as an individual who has at least one professional certification in digital forensics, and
who is actively performing digital forensics examinations as part of their job.) The testing
group was comprised of college students actively taking digital forensics courses. The val71

idation group provided for qualitative testing of the FMPU, and the testing group provided
a quantitative analysis. The testing group was further divided into experimental and control groups. Each subject was assigned to 1 of 5 trial groups based on testing location and
expertise. The testing group had some knowledge of the computer forensic process, but
were not active examiners.
Besides the obvious benefits of having validation testing, the need for a validation pool
is due to the restriction of accessing real case data, the lack of forensics test sets available
to academia, and the availability of qualified examiners to use for testing. The data sets
used for testing were manufactured. The testing group was used to test the hypothesis and
the smaller validation group was used for validation of the tool.
It was stated earlier that digital triage would be useful in the office to determine if
evidence should be sent to a lab for examination, in the field to help with search and seizure
efforts, or in the digital forensics lab for case prioritization. In the law enforcement office
the digital triage user is likely to have little to no digital forensics training. In the field
your digital triage examiner is likely to be part law enforcement and part examiner with an
intermediate level of training. Finally, your examiner in the lab is likely to be an expert.
Therefore although not law enforcement, college students in a digital forensics program
still serve as credible subjects. Digital triage is a process that is carried out at all levels of
expertise, and the FMPU was intended to be useful to all expertise levels.

72

5.1.2

Testing Environment

Validation subjects used their own chosen test set, and testing was performed in a digital
forensics lab. The monitor had little to no interaction with the actual evidence due to legal
concerns. The evidence used for the testing group was generated test sets. Test drives were
generated by two different student volunteers not directly associated with the experiment
and with minimal knowledge of what the drive was to be used for, and these individuals
had minimal knowledge of digital forensics and little or no knowledge of digital triage.
Each volunteer was provided a computer with the same base image. This base image was of a digital forensics training computer that had been in service for 2 semesters
without being reset. The base image computer was selected randomly. Usernames for the
computer were generic to avoid any misleading information. The subject was then asked
to use the drive for normal activity as well as to use it to plan/conduct a fictitious crime.
Normal activity was explained as activities normally done on a computer in a casual or
work day. Volunteers were also asked to avoid anything too personal like accessing their
bank accounts or personal social networking sites.
Each volunteer was asked to perform these activities for approximately 8 hours. On
completion they created a short scenario describing their fictitious crime. The computer
used by the volunteer was then imaged to preserve it for later testing. The evidence creation
computer was re-imaged to the base image before the next volunteer used it. The two
fictitious crime cases created were a murder scenario and a child pornography collector
(substituting images and phrases of kittens for actual children).
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The actual crime scenarios provided to each test subject during testing were simplified
versions of the scenarios turned in by the volunteers. The kitten pornography scenario was
described as an individual who collects, trades, and downloads pictures of kittens. The
murder scenario was described as a man who’s wife had gone missing, and this same man
was recently picked up in the local forest with a shovel. This information was provided to
each test subject at the beginning of testing.
The testing environment was set up with each test machine identical by imaging them
with the base set used to represent no criminal activity. Two external drives were attached
to each test machine, one imaged with the murder scenario and the other with the kitten
pornography collector scenario. The FMPU report is divided by drive designation allowing
for a single run on all three drives at once during testing. This more easily facilitated the
experiments.
Each subject in the experimental group created one keyword list that would encompass
both crime scenarios and then ran the FMPU. The control group searched through the
drive using the file browser built in to the CAINE environment or any other tool they
already knew, remembered from class, or discovered during the experiment. Subjects were
allowed to ask simple technical questions during testing, but no information was provided
to them about the case or how to interpret any results.
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5.2

Validation Group Testing - Qualitative
The following presents the testing procedure and results for the validation testing

group.

5.2.1

Validation Group Experimental Procedure

The validation group consisted of 4 fully qualified digital forensic examiners. These
subjects were provided the FMPU and a minimal set of instructions on how to use it. Prior
to running the tool on their chosen evidence, they were given a demonstration of the FMPU
on a test drive, and an explanation of the results. They were then asked to run the tool on
a case they had previously examined and could still remember clearly. The experimental
procedure was as follows:
1. Subject was asked to give a brief description of the case they intend to use to the tool
on.
2. Subject was asked to think back to the case and make a list of 5 things that would
have been helpful to know. (These 5 things should be items that would have facilitated digital triage, helped them prioritize evidence, or would have helped guide
them during their original exam.)
3. Subject was asked to make a keyword list based on those five things.
4. Subject then ran the utility based on the keyword list and viewed the report.

After the report was generated subject was asked the following questions:
• Of the 5 pieces of information that would have been useful for you to know, how
many did you find in the report? Where did you find them?
• Were there items of interest on the report that you had not listed? List them.
• What information would have been useful to include that was missing?
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5.2.2

Validation Testing Results

The results of the validation testing were in support of the FMPU. Table 5.2 shows
the number of items found versus number of items listed. As shown, all groups found at
least 1 of the items predicted after hearing a description of the program. Also, all groups
found several items they had predicted, but would have been beneficial. These metrics are
qualitative in nature not quantitative. Each subject used their own case, and there was no
real control. The value in the numbers shown here, and in the other tables in this section, is
that the tool did function on real evidence sets. For more details, see the separate validation
test descriptions at the end of this section.
Table 5.3 shows the general opinion of the tool by the test subjects. As shown, the
majority of the subjects believed this tool would decrease triage time, exam time, and
allow for case prioritization. No validation subjects disagreed or believed the tool would
not apply to their situation.
Table 5.2
Validation Test Results
Subject
1
2
3
4

Location Case Type
CCFC
Child Pornography
CCFC
Child Pornography
SWRCCI Slander
SWRCCI Child Pornography

Items Listed
5
4
4
4

Items Found
4
3
1
3

Validation tests 1 and 2 were performed at the Cyber Crime Fusion Center (CFCC)
in Jackson, Mississippi. This facility is a multi-department task force actively performing
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Table 5.3
Validation Responses
Rating:
Agree
Would Decrease Triage Time
2
Would Decrease Exam Time
3
Allow for Case Prioritization
4

Somewhat Agree
2
1
0

Don’t Agree
0
0
0

N/A
0
0
0

digital forensics investigations. Validation tests 3 and 4 were performed at the Southwest
Regional Computer Crime Institute(SWRCCI) in Saint George, Utah. This facility is an
active digital forensic laboratory established through grant funding at Dixie State College
of Utah. The results of each of these tests will now be summarized.
Validation test 1 was performed on a child pornography case involving peer-to-peer
downloading and trading. Subject hoped to find the following items:
1. Evidence of peer-to-peer traffic
2. Large amounts of graphics files
3. Internet history and search results related to the crime in question
4. Attached USB devices that could have been used for storage
5. Child pornography terminology

Subject 1 found evidence of peer-to-peer programs on 2 different user accounts, files
named with child pornography terms, USB history, and Internet activity related to child
pornography. Additionally they found four other items of interest including child pornography related shortcuts, and pertinent registry information. They commented that it would
have been beneficial to have the ability to search through document files and view thumb-
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nails. Additionally subject 1 stated that the tool would have quickly narrowed the investigation scope, and helped to focus the examination on the specific users of interest.
Subject 2 also chose a child pornography case. Subject hoped to find the following
items:
1. The breakdown of image files on the disk
2. Evidence of peer-to-peer sharing program
3. If the suspect images were from Websites or peer-to-peer sharing programs
4. The number of users on the system

Subject 2 quickly identified all items listed except for whether the primary source of
images were from Websites or peer-to-peer sharing. In addition, they found 3 items not
listed that would have been useful including the registry information of recent docs, typed
URLs, and Web browser history. Subject 2 also commented that the tool would have
narrowed down the scope of the investigation, and would liked to have seen some timeline
information included to add perspective.
Subject 3 chose a corporate case involving slander and insubordination. Subject 3
hoped to find:
1. Evidence of specific documents
2. Evidence of slander of a specific group of individuals
3. Evidence of slander concerning a specific corporate program

Of those items listed the only item found was evidence of the specific document that
held the slander used in the corporate action already taken against this individual. No
other items were identified. However, subject 3 did not find evidence of the other items
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listed during the original investigation either. Subject 3 added the comment that the most
beneficial aspect of the FMPU was the amount of time it would have saved during the
original examination. Subject 3 felt because it revealed the lack of evidence early on, it
would have reduced processing time from 6 hours to 1 hour if it had been used prior to the
original examination.
Subject 4 chose a child pornography case involving child seduction through webcam
chat. Subject hoped to find:
1. Programs related to webcam chats
2. Regular visits to webcam chat sites
3. Use of a data destruction program
4. Large numbers of jpegs and/or video files
5. Regularly visited websites

Subject 4 was able to see the file type distribution desired, the websites, and some evidence of webcam use, but the remainder of the results was limited. The user had apparently
run a data destruction program (CCleaner) on the computer recently, and it appears the user
also deleted the Web history as well. The FMPU is currently limited to Internet Explorer.
Therefore, the monitor requested that the subject confirm the presence of Internet Explorer.
Subject 4 did confirm the default Web browser on their evidence was Internet Explorer, and
that some Web history was present just not significant amounts or any significant links in
the red flag report.
Subject 4 made the comment that although the information was limited, the tool was
still useful as it would have shown this lack of evidence pre-examination. Subject 4 also
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stated that the largest advantage it would have provided would have been in prioritizing the
case. All evidence previously found on this case was carved evidence. Subject 4 felt that
running the FMPU prior to the previous examination would have predicted this fact.
On viewing all the results it was felt that at least two upgrades to the FMPU should be
considered. First, the ability for the FMPU to list all installed programs. Specific programs
can be searched for with the keyword lists, but an examiner can not always predict everything they want to see. A listing of the programs would, among other things, allow a quick
check for secure erasure programs, and specific peer-to-peer sharing programs. Further
experimentation will have to be done to determine if this program listing would be short
enough to be useful during digital triage or what filtering could be applied to make it so.
The second improvement that should, perhaps, be made is limited searches within specific file types. In a previous section keyword searches were divided into level 1 file name
only, level 2 file name and file content, and level 3 raw sector search. Perhaps a sub level
of 2 could be used to search only within certain files such as documents or HTML files.
For example, subject 3 felt the digital triage examination would have provided more conclusive results if documents could have been scanned for keywords associated with the
slander and insubordination. The idea of a crime template is part of the Semi-automated
Crime Specific Digital Triage Process model. The template used for these tests was the
simple template of keywords and file types. The author believes that this testing shows
support for the development of more advanced templates for testing.
The FMPU is currently being used by the digital forensics lab at the Southwest Regional Cyber Crime Institute at Dixie State College. These improvements and others are
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being tested, and further development is taking place from feedback provided as the FMPU
is being utilized on real case evidence.
Validation testing sought to support this research by validating the FMPU on real evidence. As already shown, the FMPU does work on real world evidence. Every subject
found items anticipated and items that had not been listed before running the FMPU. Even
on the tests that were limited in their results, test 3 and 4, it was noted that there was very
little found in the original examination either. In tests 3 and 4 the items that were found
during the original investigation were also identified by the tool. Several of the test subjects even requested a copy of the tool for real world use. Subject response to the general
qualitative questions were also positive as shown in Table 5.3.

5.3

Testing Group Testing - Quantitative
The following explains the quantitative testing of the hypothesis. The testing proce-

dure will be discussed, the trial classification outlined, the statistics used for assessment
explained, and the results provided.

5.3.1

Testing Group Experimental Procedure

The testing group tests were quantitative in nature. Test subjects were students with
basic knowledge of the digital forensic process, but subjects were not active examiners.
Both the experimental and the control group were given a lecture or lectures on digital
triage. Subjects performed short exercises or viewed demonstrations associated with each
topic as part of the lectures. These lectures covered the following topics:
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• Digital triage and previewing basics
• Linux boot environments both CD and USB
• Mounting and viewing attached disks in Linux
• Finding, listing, and sorting files in Linux
• Using the strings command to strip and view file contents
• Using the RegRipper utility
• Using the File command

These concepts are the core of the FMPU, and covering these topics will ensure that
most subjects can perform digital triage at a basic level before beginning the experiment.
Students were encouraged to take notes and write down the individual commands. They
were allowed to bring these and any other materials desired to testing. Test subjects were
further divided into 5 trials based on level of expertise and location of the testing.
Each test subject was asked to classify each drive attached to the test machine by crime
category. The experimental group used the FMPU and the control group used the more
traditional ad hoc procedure. The classification of these drives by crime category represents
the digital triage examiner’s ability to make an assessment about digital evidence. Timing
began at the point the examination process began. The hypothesis will be deemed correct
if the experimental group takes at least 50% less time on average than the control group
to make this assessment without a decrease in accuracy. Subjects were also asked the
confidence level of their selection either very confident, somewhat confident, or complete
guess. This will allow for outlier evaluation based on those who gave up or just guessed at
the answers.
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The experimental procedure for the experimental group was as follows:
1. Subject was given a brief description of the FMPU including how it works, and the
types of information it provides.
2. Subject was provided a computer with three external drives.
3. Monitor walked subject through running the FMPU and viewing the report.
4. Subject was provided two brief crime descriptions.
5. Subject was asked to make a keyword lists for the different crime types.
6. Subject then made a run of the utility with the keyword list.
7. Subject was then asked to label each drive A, B, and C. A - Evidence of child(kitten)
pornography, B - Evidence of murder preparation, and C - Nothing of evidentiary
value

The control group procedure was as follows:
1. Subject was provided a computer with three external drives..
2. Subject was provided two brief crime descriptions.
3. Subject was then asked to label each drive A, B, and C. A - Evidence of child(kitten)
pornography, B - Evidence of murder preparation, and C - Nothing of evidentiary
value

5.3.2

Experimental Trial Classification

Subjects were divided into 5 trials based on expertise and testing location. These trials
will be briefly described. Trials 1 and 2 took place at the Cyber Crime Fusion Center in
Jackson Mississippi. Test subjects for Trials 1 and 2 consisted of law enforcement officers participating in free training from the Mississippi State University National Forensics
Training Center. Instruction was provided as part of their training and participation in the
experiment was offered on completion of the training. Trial 1 consisted of 4 subjects and
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trial 2 had 8 subjects. Subjects expertise for these first two trials was labeled Intermediate. Subjects had not had a great deal of digital forensics training, but what they lacked in
digital forensic training they made up for in real world investigation experience.
Trials 3-5 all took place at Dixie State College of Utah. Subjects were given the same
lectures and demonstrations as trial 1 and 2 subjects, but testing was carried out during
scheduled time slots over a 7 day period. All subjects were students currently enrolled in
digital forensic courses. Dixie State College offers a series of courses in digital forensics
that lead to either a criminal justice degree with a digital forensics emphasis or a certificate
of completion in digital forensics.
Trial subjects expertise level for trials 3-5 was determined based on their current progress
through their chosen college program. Trial 3 subjects were enrolled in 3000 and 4000
level classes and were classified as Advanced. Trial 4 subjects were enrolled in 2000 level
courses and were classified as Intermediate. Lastly, trial 5 students were enrolled in 1000
level courses and were classified as Novice. See Table 5.4 for a summary of the trial
classifications.
Table 5.4
Trial Classification Summary
Trial
1
2
3
4
5

Group Size
4
8
15
12
11

Location
CCFC
CCFC
SWRCCI
SWRCCI
SWRCCI

Description
Police officers mixed experience
Police officers mixed experience
3000 - 4000 level students
2000 level students
1000 level students
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Expertise
Intermediate
Intermediate
Expert
Intermediate
Novice

5.3.3

Experimental Procedure Evaluation Trial 1

It should be noted that although trial 1 is included in the results it was not used in the
computation of the total final mean times. It was, however, used in the final computation
of accuracy. In addition to the primary goals of this research, trial one was conducted in
an effort to test the effectiveness of the data sets, evaluate the use of the tools on three data
sets at once, and to further refine the presentation materials presented to subjects prior to
testing. Trial 1 subjects consisted of experienced law enforcement officers with a variety
of computer and digital forensics skills. These subjects were part of an advanced digital
forensics training course offered by the National Forensics Training Center at Mississippi
State University. Subjects were offered a training session on digital triage and the digital
triage environment used by the FMPU. Students were then divided randomly into a control
group and an experimental group.
There was not much variation between the times of experimental and control subjects
for trial 1, and there was only a decrease of 19% in average times in favor of the experimental group. There was, however, an increase in average accuracy from 50% to 67%
in favor of the experimental group. (Data extracted from Table 5.9 Summarized Results
by Trial shown at the end of the chapter.) One of the contributing factors for this can be
attributed to the small size of the trial 1 test population. It was questioned as to whether
the tool itself was also a contributing factor.
The test procedure and tool function were closely examined after trial 1 was completed. The computer used for testing connects all 3 test sets at the same time to make
testing easier. This, however, creates a large amount of wait time before the subject be85

gins the examination process. The FMPU examines each volume in turn and produces the
report separated by physical disk, logical volume, and user when possible. Each of the
three test sets takes approximately 4.5 minutes to process leading to over 15 minutes of
collective processing time total. Whereas 4.5 minutes does not seem like a lot of time, the
15 minutes it takes to perform a combined analysis may stretch a test subjects patience for
the experiment and more importantly seems to take too much time to provide an advantage
over the ad-hoc procedure used by the control group.
On analysis of the FMPU it was noted that 80% of the processing time is taken in
the file classification subroutine. In an effort to determine what the volume is used for
the FMPU classifies all of the files on a volume by file type, and creates a summary of
this information. The first iteration of the FMPU performed this identification based on
the first few bytes of the file, a common technique used by digital forensics tools. This
analysis requires the comparing of each files first few bytes against a list of known first
byte signatures. An alternate file identification technique is using the last 2 or 3 letters at
the end of the file name, commonly called the file extension. This type of identification is
less accurate as a user or an application can intentionally misname the file in an attempt to
obscure data. However, for the purposes of digital triage this is acceptable. Digital triage
is about collecting quick intelligence not performing analysis.
It was also observed during trial 1 that the file classification did not seem as vital a
component as the more specific application information gathered. With this in mind prior
to trial 2, the tool was set to perform file classification based on file extension instead
of first byte signature. This change decreased the total processing time on three drives
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from 15 minutes to 4 minutes. The remaining trials were conducted with file extension
identification not first byte signature identification. Which type of classification employed
can be easily chosen with the FMPU configuration file.
Trial 1 did, however, provide validation of the quality of the test sets. Two users were
able to identify all test sets correctly with at least some confidence. It was also observed
that even with the delay caused by the file identification the crime classification could be
done within a reasonable amount of time for testing. Results also showed a wide array of
accuracy levels. Some subjects were completely correct, some were partially correct, and
a few totally wrong. These observations were further supported by the the remaining trials.

5.3.4

Analysis of the Testing Group Experiments

The independent variables for this research are the presence of the FMPU report and
level of expertise. Dependent variables are time and accuracy. Complete control group
results are presented in Table 5.7, and complete experimental group results are presented
in Table 5.8. Individual trial results are presented in Table 5.9. These three tables may be
found at the end of this chapter.
The most apparent result is that of the change in accuracy between the experimental
and control groups. As shown in Table 5.9 all but two of the experimental group subjects
were able to correctly identify each drive. Whereas, Table 5.8 shows the correctness varied
considerably within the control group. In the experimental group not everyone felt totally
confident of their assessment but, no subject felt their selection was a complete guess.
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The evaluation of time is more complex. It is not unreasonable to think that the FMPU
report would provide a larger benefit for novices than intermediate users and a larger benefit
for intermediate users than for experts. Thus, subjects were divided into trials based on
digital forensics expertise and location of testing. This division was in part an effort to
explore this predicted effect. However, as shown in Table 5.9 the results did not support
this prediction. Trial 3, classified as experts, had a mean time decrease of 71%. Whereas
trial 5, classified as novices, had a decrease of only 43% in mean time.
It could also be assumed that a higher level of expertise in digital forensics would
facilitate quicker and easier use of the tool. Average time for experimental group subjects
support this assumption as can be seen in Table 5.5. Mean time to complete the experiment
decreases with level of expertise. However also shown in Table 5.5, this does not hold true
for the control group subjects.
It is suspected that the lack of predictable responses in the control group is caused by
a higher degree of random chance and level of expertise with the Linux environment in
which testing occurred. Control subjects with more experience in the Linux environment
were possibly more confident in their results, but likelihood of success and speed was
dependent on if and how quickly they found data that allowed them to make a decision.
After all, with an ad hoc approach finding the pertinent files can be a matter of chance.
Another element of randomness was introduced by those subjects who guessed and caused
a skew in the results. Subject 2-3 took 45 minutes before making a complete guess, but
subject 4-6 gave up in 13 minutes. Randomness does not invalidate the results, but it does
make the analysis more complex.
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Table 5.5
Comparison of Mean Time and Accuracy Grouped by Expertise
Group
Expertise
Average Time(m)
Experimental Novice
19.00
Experimental Intermediate
16.6
Experimental Experts
10.89
Control
Novice
33.33
Control
Intermediate
32.00
Control
Experts
37.14
*Percent correct out of 3 possible

Standard Deviation
14.85
7.09
9.77
20.59
18.09
19.55

*Accuracy
100%
100%
93%
44%
40%
70%

The effect of the classified expertise on accuracy and mean time was further investigated. It is suspected that the expertise classification had little or no significant effect on
time or accuracy of the group as a whole. The experimental group all followed the same
process with assistance from the automated FMPU normalizing their time, but the control group subjects each approached the problem in an ad hoc fashion leading to chance
playing a larger role in the outcome. This leads the author to believe the best evaluation
metrics is that of the entire group combined or limiting the comparison to those subjects
who correctly classified all three drives to reduce the effect of those outliers caused by
chance guessing and giving up at random times.
The multivariate analysis of variance(MANOVA) test was chosen to test the interaction
between the independent variables(expertise and FMPU report presence) and the dependent variables (time and accuracy of selection). A MANOVA test compares the means of
several groups to determine the statistical significants of those groups. It addresses the interaction significance between the dependent and independent variables. MANOVA is also
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typically used when there is a fear of noise caused by the interaction of the variables. In
this circumstance noise can be attributed to random chance in the control group and varied
expertise in digital forensics or in Linux. MANOVA reports the different interactions of
the variables as separate univariate results as part of the primary multivariate analysis[29].
The MANOVA univariate tests are provided in Table 5.6. As shown the effect of expertise on time resulted in an F=0.131 and a P=0.878 and so the test fails to reject the null
hypothesis that there is no difference between the expertise groups for time. The effect
of expertise on accuracy resulted in an F= 0.863 and a P=0.429 and so this test also fails
to reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the expertise groups for
accuracy. This shows that expertise has no statistical significance on the test results.
The MANOVA further reported the effect of the presence or absence of the FMPU
report on time with an F=18.40 and a P=0.000. The presence or absence of the FMPU
report effect on accuracy was reported as an F=18.99 and a P=0.000. The Wilk’s Lambda
for the multivariate test itself was report as F=0.462 and p=0.000 supporting the validity of
multivariate results. In reference to both time and accuracy this rejects the null hypothesis
that the groups are the same showing the means are significant between the control and
experimental groups.
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Table 5.6
MANOVA Univariate Results
Independent Variable
Expertise
Expertise
FMPU Report
FMPU Report

Dependent Variable
Time
Accuracy
Time
Accuracy

Degrees of Freedom
2, 44
2, 44
1, 44
1, 44

F
p
0.131 0.878
0.863 0.429
18.40 0.000
18.99 0.000

Based on the above statical evaluation the metric that best describes the results of the
experiment is that of total experimental mean compared to the control group mean. For
additional analysis the results of only the groups who got everything correct are of interest
as well. All these results, the final conclusions, and future work can be found in Chapter 6.
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Table 5.7
Control Results
Subject ID Time (minutes) Number Correct * Level of Confidence **
1-1
42
0
Complete Guess
1-2
36
3
Totally Confident
2-1
21
1
Somewhat Confident
2-2
31
0
Somewhat Confident
2-3
45
1
Complete Guess
2-4
33
0
Somewhat Confident
3-1
38
3
Totally Confident
3-2
12
3
Totally Confident
3-3
20
1
Totally Confident
3-4
38
1
Somewhat Confident
3-5
54
1
Somewhat Confident
3-6
69
3
Totally Confident
3-7
29
3
Somewhat Confident
4-1
66
3
Somewhat Confident
4-2
55
3
Somewhat Confident
4-3
13
0
Somewhat Confident
4-4
18
3
Totally Confident
4-5
25
0
Complete Guess
4-6
13
1
Complete Guess
5-1
12
1
Somewhat Confident
5-2
34
3
Complete Guess
5-3
20
0
Somewhat Confident
5-4
19
0
Complete Guess
5-5
65
1
Somewhat Confident
5-6
50
3
Somewhat Confident
* Out of 3
** Options are : a. Totally Confident, b. Somewhat Confident, c. Complete Guess
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Table 5.8
Experimental Results
Subject ID Time (minutes) Number Correct * Level of Confidence **
1-1
42
3
Somewhat Confident
1-2
21
1
Totally Confident
2-1
14
3
Somewhat Confident
2-3
11
3
Somewhat Confident
2-4
10
3
Totally Confident
3-1
9
1
Somewhat Confident
3-2
12
3
Somewhat Confident
3-3
13
3
Somewhat Confident
3-4
7
3
Somewhat Confident
3-5
12
3
Somewhat Confident
3-6
10
3
Totally Confident
3-7
9
3
Totally Confident
3-8
13
3
Totally Confident
3-9
13
3
Totally Confident
4-1
13
3
Totally Confident
4-2
18
3
Totally Confident
4-3
28
3
Totally Confident
4-4
18
3
Totally Confident
4-5
28
3
Totally Confident
4-6
10
3
Totally Confident
5-1
33
3
Totally Confident
5-2
12
3
Somewhat Confident
5-3
12
3
Somewhat Confident
5-4
11
3
Totally Confident
5-5
27
3
Totally Confident
* Out of 3
** Options are : a. Totally Confident, b. Somewhat Confident, c. Complete Guess
Note: Test subject 2-2 had a hardware failure during the test.
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Trial
Group
1
Control Group
1
Experimental
Percent Decrease: 19%
2
Control Group
2
Experimental
Percent Decrease: 64%
3
Control Group
3
Experimental
Percent Decrease: 71%
4
Control Group
4
Experimental
Percent Decrease: 39%
5
Control Group
5
Experimental
Percent Decrease: 43%
All Correct
Control Group
All Correct
Experimental
Percent Decrease: 60%
All
Control Group
All
Experimental
Percent Decrease: 53%
*Percent correct out of 3 possible
23.03
7.49
20.59
10.27
19.10
8.97
18.42
7.13

33.33
19.00
40.70
16.35
33.91
14.91

19.55
9.77

37.14
10.89
31.67
19.17

18.42
7.13

51%
95%

100%
100%

44%
100%

56%
100%

71%
93%

51%
97%

StandardDeviation *Mean Accuracy
4.24
50%
14.85
67%

32.50
11.67

Mean Time(minutes)
39.00
31.50

Summarized Results by Trial

Table 5.9

CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

With the means between the experimental group and control group confirmed statistically different by the MANOVA test, the final results can now be considered. However as
shown, the 5 trial separation by expertise classification was shown not significant. Therefore, no post hoc analysis was conducted with individual trials.

6.1

Main Hypothesis and Research Question Results
The main hypothesis of this dissertation is that the Semi-automated Digital Triage Pro-

cess Model could reduce digital triage assessment by at least 50% without decreasing accuracy. This model was realized through the creation of the Fast Modular Profiling Utility
(FMPU). Testing was designed around the FMPU to research this hypothesis. Testing subjects were organized into 5 trials based on testing location and digital forensics expertise
leading to two dependent variables, the presence or absence of the FMPU and level of
digital forensics expertise.
The level of expertise, as classified by the trials, was deemed not significant. Digital
forensics expertise had little effect, but it is further believed that Linux expertise might
have had some effect. Further statistical analysis showed that the presence or absence of
the FMPU had a statistically significant effect on time and accuracy. This leads to the
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conclusion that the Semi-automated Digital Triage Process Model implemented with the
FMPU is useful in digital triage regardless of the digital forensics expertise of the user.
Even though the effect of expertise was shown insignificant on the group as a whole,
it did seem to have some effect on the experimental group who were utilizing the FMPU.
Average time decreased from 19.00 minutes to 16.6 minutes to 10.89 minutes from the
novice, intermediate, and expert respectively, but the level of accuracy was rated 7% lower
for experts when compared to novices and intermediate users. (See Chapter 5 Table 5.5.)
If we assume expertise did have an effect on the experimental group as it seems to, then
novices actually seem to perform better with the FMPU than experts. If we assume expertise did not have an effect, then novices did just as well as experts.
This lack of need for digital forensics expertise could be useful to the digital forensics
community. Take for example a laboratory environment. Reducing the backlog of digital
forensics laboratories was previously mentioned as one of the benefits of employing digital
triage. If digital expertise is irrelevant to the accuracy of digital triage assessment when
using the FMPU, then it could be used by novices in the digital examination laboratories to
triage cases. Novices in this instance could be new employees, outside law enforcement,
or investigators who do not normally do examinations. This could decrease case backlogs
and increase laboratory efficiency by allowing for case prioritization, allowing for case
dismissal before being checked in to evidence, and quicker intelligence for situations where
the digital evidence is not likely to go to court such as suicides or plea bargaining.
With the significance of digital triage expertise shown not significant to the group as a
whole, the most valuable metric is that of the entire control group compared to the entire
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experimental group. The decrease in time from experimental to control when comparing
all subjects was 53%. An additional test to compare just those with 100% accuracy, in an
effort de-emphasis the results from those who made their selection randomly by guessing,
resulted in a 60% decrease in time. Both of these values support the hypothesis.
The second part of the hypothesis was that the proposed model would not decrease
accuracy. Comparing the groups as a whole the increase in accuracy was from 1.52 out of
3.00 for the control group to 2.84 out of 3.00 for the experimental group. Accuracy was
not only not decreased, but it was increased by 54%.

6.2

Research Weaknesses and Future Work
There is not a lot of research in the area of digital forensics and digital triage. There-

fore, this research provides several avenues for future work. This section mentions a few
directions that work could take using this research as a base. For example, the author acknowledges that the size of the testing pool was relatively small, and future testing could
be done to include more subjects for testing. Other future works could include alternate
implementations of the proposed model, different user classifications, and further crime
template development.
Testing was done through one implementation of the model. A different implementation could produce different results. However, this single implementation does support the
value of the model itself. Included in these alternate implementations could be any or all
of the upgrades mentioned in this manuscript. For example, limited file searches within
specific file types could be implemented and tested.
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Although digital triage is undertaken by users at all levels of expertise, the use of
more experienced examiners could also show different results. However, this tool certainly
demonstrates that the proposed model is useful for users that are not active examiners.
Originally the classification of expertise was based on digital forensics expertise. The
model should be tested by levels of Linux expertise as well. As no data was kept about the
test subjects, there is no way to go back and re-analyze the data based on Linux expertise
classification. Future work could be to re-test with users classified based on this expertise
instead and observe the results or re-run the experiments with users all at the same level of
Linux expertise to remove it as possible noise.
The Semi-automated Digital Triage Process Model calls for crime class customization
based on a template. The basic template used in this testing was a keyword template to red
flag results of interest, and the examination of what file types are on the system. Crime
class modeling is an open area for research and incorporating different templates specific
to different crime classes would be useful research pursued from this research.

6.3

Final Remarks
In this dissertation a model was proposed and peer reviewed through publication[9].

It was then implemented and that implementation was also peer reviewed and currently
pending publication with the Journal of Digital Forensics Security and Law. The final
results have also been submitted for peer review. Through a validation and testing group
the proposed model, implemented through the FMPU, was tested. Results show that it does
indeed decrease digital triage time by at least 50% and that it does not decrease accuracy.
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Contributions of this work include a new tested digital triage process for the scientific community and a new digital triage tool. It is also the hopes of the author that the
publication of such a tool will encourage others in the creation of their own utility. Further contributions of this research include at least 2 articles added to the body of scientific
knowledge, and additional support for digital triage modeling within the digital forensic
practicing community.
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SAMPLE FAST MODULAR PROFILING REPORT
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The following pages contain a selection from an example FMPU report. The actual
report would be in HTML. These pages are only meant to provide an idea of the navigation,
and content of a report.

A.1

Index Page
Figure A.1 shows a screen shot of the index page as produced by the FMPU. The index

page is automatically opened at the end of the FMPU run. This page links the main report
and the alert report.

Figure A.1
Screen shot of FMPU index page

A.2

Disks and Volumes Report
Figure A.2 displays the Disks and Volumes Report. This report is the first report on the

main page. Here the digital triage examiner can quickly identify all physical and logical
volumes and view the sector layout of the disk itself.
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Figure A.2
Screen shot of the physical and logical disk layout report

A.3

File Summary Report
The File Summary Report is shown in Figure A.3. This report allows the user to view

a listing, by volume or by user directory, of all files on the volume. The number in parenthesis after each link identifies the number of different file types identified. This allows
the examiner to quickly determine which volume and which user directory is most used.
Figure A.4 shows a sample of the actual file classification report for the entire volume.

A.4

Registry Report
Figure A.5 shows a screen shot of the Registry Report found after the File Summary

Report. The first three links shown in Figure A.5 link directly to registry reports for the
entire system. The remaining links link to HTML pages outlining the registry reports
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Figure A.3
Screen shot of the file type summaries report

Figure A.4
Screen shot of the file type summaries report for a volume
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generated per user account. Figure A.6 shows the single registry report USBStor. This
report shows all USB devices that have been attached to the device recently according to
the Windows registry.

A.5

Web History Report
Figure A.7 provides a sample of a Web History Report. The numbers in parenthesis at

the end of each line display the number of items contained within the linked report. This
allows the digital triage examiner to more quickly sort through the reports to those that
have the most items of interest. Figure A.8 shows a sample of a domain summary report.

A.6

Red Flag Report
Figure A.9 shows a Red Flag Report linked from the main page shown in Figure A.1.

This report links together all of the results of the keyword filter. Figure A.10 shows a small
sample of two file name hits from the keywords: Facebook, and children.
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Figure A.5
Screen shot of the registry report

Figure A.6
Screen shot of the USBStor registry report
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Figure A.7
Screen shot of the Web history report

Figure A.8
Screen shot of the Web history report domain summary
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Figure A.9
Screen shot of the red flag report

Figure A.10
Screen shot of the red flag report with two file name hits
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